



**ASSAD'S**

**GHOSTS UNMASKED**

An Evidence -Based Report

August 2023

<https://cija-syria-paramilitaries.org>



## **Commission for International Justice and Accountability**

The Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation dedicated to furthering criminal justice efforts through investigations, in order to prevent the loss and destruction of vital evidence for the purpose of supporting prosecutorial efforts to end impunity, whether at the domestic or international level.

© Commission for International Justice and Accountability, August 2023

Multimedia report: <https://cija-syria-homs.org>

The multimedia report was designed by The Stories Communication

Suggested citation:

Commission for International Justice and Accountability, "Assad's Ghosts Unmasked", August 2023



CJAonline.org



CJAOnline



The Commission for International Justice and Accountability

# **ASSAD'S GHOSTS** **UNMASKED**



# 1. INVESTIGATING ASSAD'S GHOSTS

Photo: Still from UNSMISS video, "UN Observers enter Mazraat al-Qubeir" uploaded to YouTube on 08 June 2012

For years, the crimes committed by the Shabbiha were ascribed to shadowy paramilitary gangs whose affiliation to official Syrian Regime structures could not be ascertained. Now, CIJA evidence, released in part through this report, shows clear linkage between these militia groups and the Regime's chain of command, demonstrating the state's incremental reliance on these brutal gangs to enforce the governments' crackdown on peaceful protesters and later, to attack the civilian population.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, victims, witnesses, journalists and the United Nations investigators revealed horrifying acts of cruelty, carried out by groups of armed men. Killings. Arbitrary detention. Torture. Sexual violence against men, women, and girls. There appeared to be no crime these groups would abstain from committing.

As early as August 2012 an investigation by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) into a series of attacks by these armed groups found that they formed part of a pattern of unlawful killings and other crimes committed in anti-Regime areas across the country. Attacks occurred in concert with the Syrian armed forces, who would begin with blockades and shelling before ground assaults of special forces and armed *Shabbiha* gangs. Searches would be made house to house, removing and executing activists, defectors, fighting aged men, and often, their family members or other randomly selected individuals. Before long, the news of unprecedented massacres of civilians by the secretive pro-Regime paramilitary groups flooded the international media.

The reports drew upon circumstantial evidence which showed that the *Shabbiha*<sup>1</sup> acted alongside Government forces, forming part of the Regime's response to the protesters and opposition. But there appeared to be no direct evidence of this relationship. The COI Report considered that:

*"Eyewitnesses consistently identified the Shabbiha as perpetrators of many of the crimes described in the present report. Although the nature, composition, hierarchy and structure of this group remains opaque, credible information led to the conclusion that Shabbiha members acted with the acquiescence of, in concert with or at the behest of Government forces."*

In the years that followed, more information on these paramilitary groups, their crimes and membership was revealed. The crimes themselves were in the main well documented through social media, videos, as well as witness, survivor and defector testimonies. Similarly well reported was the localised set up,

---

<sup>1</sup> The term "Shabbiha" has generated its own momentum in the Syrian conflict, but it does not always assist in understanding the context, nuance, variety or development of key defined Regime loyalist or paramilitary groups nor their link to the formal security structure. The term can mask a number of recognised pro-Regime groups, including mobilised pro-Regime loyalists, Ba'athist supporters, village defence forces, tribal groups, Popular Committees and other paramilitary groups. Moreover it is not a phrase routinely used by the Syrian authorities in their own documentation.



membership and patronage of these groups. But no undeniable link to the Syrian State apparatus could be established.

Autocratic states have historically utilised paramilitary groups to do their dirty work in order to claim plausible deniability. Whereas the link and benefit to the state could be perceived, it was difficult to prove in the court of law. The Syrian Regime was no different, appearing to resort to outsourcing some of the most vicious acts of violence of the conflict.

*“It is clear that the state benefited from relying on these groups as they provided it with plausible deniability by allowing it to disavow any linkage with these shadowy organisations by claiming they were private groups committing violence on their own volition.”*

**Ugur Ümit Üngör, Shabbiha: Paramilitary Groups, Mass Violence and Social Polarization in Homs, in Violence: An International Journal, Volume 1: Issue 1**

CIJA can now reveal how the highest levels of the Syrian Regime planned, organised, instigated and deployed these paramilitary groups in order to assist the state's crackdown on the opposition. Among CIJA's collection of over one million pages of documents produced by various Syrian state entities are those detailing the growth of the paramilitary organisations from small -or neighbourhood- level loyalist groups to a well-organised militia.

Although the Syrian Regime predominantly deployed its formal security structures to suppress anti-Regime demonstrations, it also featured the mobilisation and use of pro-Regime loyalist or paramilitary groups. Evidence in CIJA's possession -documents issued, signed and stamped by members of the Syrian Regime- show how the highest levels of the Regime mobilised, coordinated and supervised a wide cohort of Assad loyalists including Ba'ath party members, village defence forces and tribal groups, formalising some into Popular Committees and, ultimately, the National Defence Force.

2.

# Mobilisation:

## “Activate” Loyalist Groups

"Assad or we burn the country"

Photo: AFP PHOTO/HO/GENERAL COMMITTEE OF THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION

Pro-Regime loyalist groups were mobilised and used from the very early stages of the conflict, which was characterised by the outbreak of unprecedented demonstrations and the appearance of anti-government, anti-Assad graffiti in some areas of Syria.

Following protests in Aleppo on 17 January 2011, instructions were circulated through the branches of the Regime's security agencies and down to local Security Committees to utilise Ba'ath party resources and infrastructure -amongst others- for these purposes. The Security Committees operated in every governorate, coordinating the work of the security agencies and, until November 2011, were headed by the Ba'ath party leader of the respective governorate.

In Deir ez-Zour, 400 kilometres away, the Head of Military Intelligence Branch 243 sent the order down the chain of command requesting Branch sections and detachments to remain alert, plant informers, operate patrols, and prevent the occurrence of further protests by taking any “necessary actions”. The

circular ended by demanding full compliance and insisted that “no leniency” would be given in implementing this instruction.

A few weeks later, the same intelligence head chastised their subordinate units for failing to suppress “abusive graffiti” and instructed them to crack down on it by streamlining the work of security forces and loyalist groups, including Ba'ath party apparatus and members. These were not isolated instructions stemming from regional or local authorities.

*“You are requested to give sufficient attention to your security sector, plant informers and sources of information, operate patrols, and always be aware and effectively present in a manner that prevents the occurrence of such or any other security breaches. You are also requested to immediately report the occurrence of any disturbance, identify perpetrators and take the necessary action at the responsibility of the lead of the detachment in person. No leniency will be shown in this matter in any of your sectors.”*

**Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 243 to all Military Intelligence Sections and Detachments, 18 January 2011 [See Annex 1]**

The documents refer to instructions issued by the National Security Bureau (NSB), a long-standing state security body responsible for coordinating all security agencies of the Syrian State. Up until late March 2011, the NSB passed instructions through to the security bodies for action, after which it distributed and oversaw the implementation of instructions and decisions issued by orders of the newly established Central Crisis Management Cell. The decision to engage the loyalist groups to assist in suppressing the protests came from the highest echelons of power.

By 02 March 2011, the breadth of loyalist groups directed to respond to the situation was increased with an instruction issued by Military Intelligence to “mobilise and activate the work of all security agents, informers, sources and Ba'ath Party sub-divisions, popular organisations, leaders of National



Progressive Front parties and all friends” who were tasked to detect graffiti, publications or gatherings within their area and to report them immediately. Six days later, the same Branch received a more acute instruction to “intensify monitoring and streamlining the work of sources, informers and members of the Ba'ath Party.”


However, the suppression was failing, with demonstrations and opposition activity spreading across the country, bringing in larger numbers of people with each passing week. On 16 March 2011 thousands of people protested on the streets of Damascus, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Hama and Dar'a. Colloquially known as the Day of Rage, this marked the beginning of the nationwide uprising against the Regime.

See also:

**Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 243, 07 February 2011 [Annex 2]**

**Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction, 31 March 2011 [Annex 3]**

# 3. Control: The Ba'ath Party Element



**Ba'ath Party Regional Command Structure**

The most convenient and effective structures to draw upon in search of loyalists was the Ba'ath Party: its extensive web of branches, divisions and sub-divisions stood ready to be taken advantage of.

Between March and April 2011, the Regime used this network to establish new organisations with local knowledge and networks to confront the opposition: the Popular Committees. Membership consisted of Ba'ath party loyalists as well as trade unions, which fed the Regime narrative of an organic, popular, pro-Regime response to the demonstrations, rather than merely an Alawite faction. Documents in CIJA's collection show how these Popular Committees were anything but spontaneous, but were instead a closely instructed and monitored state organisation, under the instruction and tutelage of the local Security Committees, agencies and police.

A snapshot of how this worked can be found in communications from Raqqa Governorate.

On 30 March 2011, instructions were issued to all sections and detachments, including to the Chief of Detachment in Tell Abiad, with the Head of Military Intelligence Branch 243 in Deir-ez-Zor (over 200 kilometres away) instructing the Detachment to “draw up an action plan” to confront the opposition with full and effective coordination and instant communication, along with the creation of two groups of Ba'ath party members: one to be deployed in mosques and the other as “a reserve force that waits at offices”.

The Detachment Chief quickly requested clarification on the order, receiving further instructions the same day:

*“[...] You are requested to put all members of Ba'ath Party, trade unions and popular organisations on a state of high alert. And you are requested to distribute tasks among such members in mosques [...]. You are also requested to form a joint operations centre for all security bodies so as to share information and wisely confront opponents and arrest them.”*

**Military Intelligence Branch 243 (Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa) instruction, 30 March 2011**

On 7 April the Security Committee of Tell Abiad district held a meeting and among other matters issued “an instruction to Ba'athist comrades to show up for prayers and mosques on 8 April 2011”.

Shortly afterwards the use of Ba'athist loyalists was further formalised within the overall security measures implemented by the Regime. On 11 April 2011, Military Intelligence Branch 243 sent out a request to its sections and detachments and instructed them to:

*“coordinate with [the] head of the Electoral Committee and mobilise members of the Ba'ath Party in every district and form the so-called popular committees in every district so as to protect towns and defend public departments as well as confront anti-government elements and criminal gangs. Such committees should be supervised by partisan subdivisions and divisions in the said districts, and their work shall be streamlined by the security committee in the districts and under your personal supervision in coordination with Ba'ath party officials.”*

**Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction to all sections and departments, 11 April 2011**

**[See Annex 4]**

Such documents confirm that the Popular Committees were integrated within the Ba'ath party chain of command and demonstrate how they were rapidly integrated into the Regime's overall security coordination efforts.

4.

# Escalation:

“The Time of Tolerance Is Over”


Photo: Syrianobserver.com

In fact, documents in CIJA's possession show how while these actions were taking place on governorate level, they were overseen and orchestrated from the highest echelons of power in Damascus.

As the Regime continued to lose its grip on the situation, protests escalated into armed opposition, and the authorities took steps to improve and centralise control of its security response. The existing model of communication, information sharing and coordination between military, political and security elements was considered to be insufficient. The Central Crisis Management Committee (CCMC) -an ad hoc senior level committee- was created in March 2011 to coordinate the Regime's



response to the uprising. The senior decision-making body reported directly to President Assad and brought together the senior heads of the national security and intelligence agencies, the Interior Minister, the Defence Minister and others into a single leadership body.



In one of its first instructions on 18 April 2011, the CCMC declared that the “time of tolerance and meeting demands is over” and that a “multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators, saboteurs of security and vandals” was to be undertaken. The Popular Committees and other groups were ordered to undergo military and security training on the use of weapons and in confronting opposition demonstrators and they were ordered to counter opposition demonstrations, as well as apprehend and hand over suspected opposition members to the security and army, marking an escalation from their earlier role in guarding buildings to directly and forcibly targeting opposition members. Moreover, the Regime sought to maintain oversight and control of these groups by

ordering the placement of trained personnel into these units to ensure that their actions were well organised.

*"5. Role of the Party apparatus (Party organisations, popular organisations and trade unions):*

*Train selected personnel on confronting demonstrators, as well as on the use of weapons*

*Establish round-the-clock shifts in Party headquarters [...]*

*Contribute to countering anti-government demonstrations [...]*

*Incorporate trained personnel in units with commands so that their interventions be well-organised"*

**CCMC Meeting Minutes, 18 April 2011, disseminated by Military Intelligence Branch 294**

**Circular, 20 April 2011 [See Annex 5]**

Yet more documents show how this order was acted upon. A CCMC report dated 11 May 2011 included a report of a high-level visit to Homs, which demonstrated that leadership of the CCMC met directly with loyalist groups to implement the order and roll-out their members across the city. Ba'athist governorate leadership were instructed to assist in dealing with the opposition, with the city to be divided into zones or sectors (often referred to as departments), each supervised by a leading member of the security branch. A few days later, the Ba'ath Party in Idleb requested and received approval from the Head of Branch 271 to train 100 'citizens' while numerous documents between Branch 271, the Security Committee and the Ba'ath Party Branch reveal requests and approval for the supply of Russian rifles to arm named civilians.

# 5.

# Militarisation:

“use weapons in coordination with security agencies”

As the conflict escalated over the summer, the role of Popular Committees and other pro-Regime groups in suppressing the opposition was further integrated with the military and security forces. On 5 August 2011, the CCMC met to discuss poor communications between the formal security apparatus and various loyalist groups resulting in “human and material losses” and allowing “armed gangs to keep conducting acts of looting plunder killing and intimidating citizens.”

The CCMC discussed how to better synchronise the work of the security agencies. The following day, the NSB passed down CCMC instructions to governorate-level Secretaries of the Ba'ath Party, i.e. the Heads of Governorate Security Committees. Daily joint military/security operations were to be

conducted to arrest individuals from specific groups and to set up Joint Investigative Committees to process detainees. The Popular Committees were to be used to maintain control of areas “cleansed” of the protesters.

*“Once each sector has been cleansed of wanted persons you are requested to maintain control of the sector by organising security and party presence in the sector in cooperation with the city district committee, popular organisations, dignitaries and influential supporters, so that no wanted person can seek shelter there again.”*

**Head of the NSB to the Secretaries of the Ba'ath Party in Hama, Damascus Countryside, Deir-  
ez-Zor, Homs, Idleb and Dar'a governorates, 06 August 2011 [See Annex 6]**

These instructions were passed down through the chain of command to the Secretaries of Ba'ath Party branches in the Hama, Deir-ez-Zor, rural Damascus, Homs, Idleb and Dar'a governorates, who in turn instructed their subordinate units to carry out the order. Before long, documents show that instructions were given for these groups “to be trained to use weapons in coordination with security agencies”.

The allocation of such clearly defined roles to pro-Regime paramilitary groups in controlling territory is critical to understanding why such groups were noted as being present during or after operations undertaken by the Syrian security forces.

# 6.

# Empowerment:

## “Do Not Oppose” Loyalist Comrades

Throughout 2011 and 2012 witnesses and survivors consistently reported the presence of “Shabbiha” -as they called them- at various massacres across the country.

The crimes committed by the paramilitaries were undeniably reported up the chain of command. However, to no avail.

Some early CCMC documents show attempts to abolish the Popular Committees, possibly in reaction to increasing reports of looting and crimes committed by their members. For example, on 20 April 2011 CCMC meeting conclusions were circulated through the Regional Command, including an order “cancelling the Popular Committees.” Four days later, CCMC issued minutes from its meeting on 22



April 2011, where it “confirmed that the Popular Committees will stop working” with responsibility for “keeping order in [the] governorates” lying with the Ba'ath Party and Security Committees.

*"19- Cancel[...] the Popular Committees"*


**CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011 [See Annex 7]**

But these efforts were not genuine attempts to stem the use of irregular forces and militias. CCMC documents issued that same week instructed the continued use of loyalist groups, in addition to arming and training them.

The level of violence and the criminal conduct of the militia was unpalatable even to some representatives of the official security and military apparatus. This led to occasional clashes and arrests of the loyalists. The Regime's highest-level leaders undeniably knew that these groups were carrying out criminal acts.

Yet, as some documents in CIJA's possession show, they instructed their subordinates to let the militias be, rather than investigating or punishing them, in clear breach of their responsibility as superiors or commanders.

For example, Branch 271's instructions show it was aware that the popular organisations had engaged in abuses against the civilian population, including arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, and personal score-settling. A group which was under the patronage of the Air Force Intelligence Branch in Idleb and armed with regular and machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades, gained notoriety for its unlawful detention and mistreatment of citizens.



Locations of notorious massacres with heavy Popular Committee / paramilitary involvement, 2012 -2013

The instruction from Branch 271 to its subordinates however was clear: “Some of the security branches arrested these comrades. Therefore, please make sure that the security and military checkpoints pay attention and do not oppose them.”



7.

# Integration:

## The National Defence Force

*Photo: SANA/Handout*

The Regime's increased tolerance and reliance on paramilitaries was driven by the context of where the conflict stood at the time. The opposition's armed faction - grouped under the umbrella Free Syrian Army - had taken large swathes of territory, while sizeable numbers of Syrian soldiers and commanders had defected to the opposition.

One of the Regime's responses was to absorb and integrate the Popular Committees into a formal government paramilitary force called the National Defence Force (NDF). A Syrian Army Commander explained that NDFs were set up as the leadership had started to lose faith in the army and its

effectiveness, and a lot of soldiers had fled or joined the opposition. By 2013 these new formations were being sent to the battle front, giving the loyalist militia yet another role in the conflict.

An NDF Commander at the time told the media that his forces brought the civilian militias under a formal military structure with military discipline that provided training and weaponry.

CIJA's collection of documents from Idleb shows that, from 2014 onwards, the NDF forces were under the command of the local Security and Military Committee. Documents show the extent of control and supervision exercised by the Head of the Committee who issued regular instructions to his subordinate forces, including the NDF.

The level of command and control can also be inferred from the fact that the NDF Commander was requesting approval from the Head of the Idleb Security Military Committee for tasks as mundane as requesting other security and military forces to search for a missing assault rifle. Finally, documents show that the Idleb Security and Military Committee also received official reports from General Intelligence on incidents of alleged criminal activity by NDF fighters, indicating that the security agencies had a role in disciplinary control over NDF units.

The NDF represents a culmination of the Regime's embrace of loyalist groups and their transformation into an entity that is intrinsically intertwined with official structures. Transformed from the early eyes and ears of the Regime to brothers in arms with the Syrian military and security forces, the loyalist groups have grown in size and importance since the beginning of the war. While the Regime's initial attempts may have been to publicly deny this connection, the documents collected by CIJA's investigators undeniably reveal the connection between it and the paramilitary groups drawn from the Ba'ath party ranks.

# Annexes

1. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 243 to all Military Intelligence Sections and Detachments, 18 January 2011
2. Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 243, 07 February 2011
3. Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction, 31 March 2011
4. Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction to all sections and departments, 11 April 2011
5. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 18 April 2011, disseminated by Military Intelligence Branch 294 Circular, 20 April 2011
6. Head of the NSB to the Secretaries of the Ba'ath Party in Hama, Damascus Countryside, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, Idleb and Dar'a governorates, 06 August 2011
7. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011



SYR.D0043.002.009\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

1. Communication from Military Intelligence Branch 243 to all Military Intelligence Sections and Detachments, 18 January 2011

[illegible]-JAN-2011 11:0[illegible] From 218858 To:022730300 1/5  
Syrian Arab Republic Circulars Classified Archive To Be Read Out Loud  
General Command of the  
Army and Armed Forces  
Intelligence Department—  
Branch 243  
Telegram: Number /1349/243/7 Date 18/1/2011 Up to

**(Circular)**

In implementation of the content of Circular Number /344/, dated 17/1/2011, issued by the Mr. Major General, Head of the Intelligence Department, (a copy of which is archived with us), and based on the instructions of the National Security Bureau to security committees in the governorates regarding the distribution of security sectors, how they are covered by security agencies and the responsibility of each agency for what happens in its security sector, - And as a result of what happened in Damascus in November and December 2009, and what happened in Aleppo on 17/1/2011 consisting of the burning of military, civilian and police vehicles and the security breaches,

You are requested to give sufficient attention to your security sector, plant informers and sources of information, operate patrols, and be always and effectively present in a manner that prevents the occurrence of such or any other security-breaching acts. You are also requested to immediately report the occurrence of any disturbances, identify perpetrators and take the necessary action at the responsibility of the head of the detachment in person. No leniency will be shown in this matter in any of your sectors.

Mr. Head of the Branch looks forward to full compliance with the content of this circular and any violation will incur consequences.

Sent to:  
Branch sections and  
detachments

263  
18 1 2011

Anti-Terrorism  
Abide by the content  
and act accordingly

[Signature]

[Stamp: General  
Command of the  
Army and Armed  
Forces\*Intelligence  
Department—Branch  
243]

Head of Branch 243  
[Signature]

أ. ل. ع.

مكتب التعميم

الجمهورية العربية السورية  
انقيادة العمدة لتدريش و القوات المسلحة  
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٤٣

برقية رقم / ١٢٤٩ / ٧ / ٢٤٣ / تاريخ ٢٠١١ / ١٨ / ١٧ للغة

(تعميم)

تفيداً لمضمون التعميم رقم / ٣٤٤ / تاريخ ٢٠١١ / ١ / ١٧ الصادر عن السيد اللواء  
رئيس شعبة المخابرات (لمحفوظ لدينا) واستناداً لتعليمات مكتب الأمن القومي  
اللجان الأمنية بالمحافظات حول توزيع القطاعات الأمنية وكيفية تغطيتها من قبل  
الأجهزة الأمنية ومسؤولية كل جهاز عما يحدث في قطاعه الأمني .

- ونتيجة لما حصل في دمشق بالشهرين الحادي عشر والثاني عشر من الامم ٢٠٠٩  
وما حصل في محافظة حلب بتاريخ ٢٠١١ / ١ / ١٧ من حرق للسيارات العسكرية  
والمدنية والشرطة والإخلال بالأمن .

لذلك يطالب اليكم الاهتمام الكافي في القطاع الامني التابع لكم وزرع المصادر  
والمندوبين وتسيير النوريات والتواجد الدائم والفعال بشكل يؤمن منع حدوث مثل ذلك  
أو غيرها من الأعمال المخلة بالأمن والإعلام فور وقوع أي خال ومعرفة الفاعلين  
وإجراء اللازم وعلى مسؤولية رئيس المفروزة تحديداً ولن يتم التساهل حيال ذلك في  
أي قطاع من قطاعاتكم .

يأمل السيد رئيس الفرع التقيد التام بمضمون هذا التعميم وكل مخالفة  
تستوجب المسؤولية .

مكتب التعميم

٢٤٣

مكتب التعميم

التعميم رقم ١١١

١١١

١١١

٢٤٣



SYR.D0043.004.263\_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicate translator commentary.]

2. Circular from Military Intelligence Branch 243, 07 February 2011

07 FEB 2011 12:13 From: 218858 To: 00963 22 730337 P. 2/2

Syrian Arab Republic  
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces  
Intelligence Department - Branch 243  
No.: /2851/1  
Date: 7/2/2011

Highly Confidential

**Circular**

The wave of abusive graffiti on the walls of (schools, government organizations and department and traffic signs, etc.) is still continuing, which amounts to a big insult to the reputation of security bodies in the region and gives a wrong image about them.

Therefore, you are instructed to streamline the work of sources, informers, Ba'ath Party members, joint security patrols and the police to suppress these activities and arrest those responsible for organizing it at the responsibility of the detachment heads.

Head of Branch 243  
[Signature]  
[Stamp: General Command of the Army and Armed Forces  
Intelligence Department – Branch 243]

675  
7/2/2011

Security Office  
- To be read out in the morning meeting  
[Signature]

الجمهورية العربية السورية  
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة  
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٤٣  
الرقم: ١ / ٢٨٥١ /  
التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٥/٧

سري للغاية

تعميم

لاتزال موجة الكتابات المسيئة على الجدران مستمرة ( مدارس - مؤسسات - دوائر -  
شاخصات سير ... الخ ) الامر الذي يشكل اساءة كبيرة لسمعة الأجهزة الأمنية في المنطقة  
ويعطي صورة مشوهة عنها .  
يطلب إليكم تنشيط المصادر والمندوبين والجهاز الحزبي والدوريات الأمنية المشتركة  
والشرطة لقمع هذه النشاطات وتوقيف جميع القائمين عليها وعلى مسؤولية رؤساء المفارز

رئيس الفرع ٢٤٣





مكتب الأمن

سلاوة شالاجع الصالح



٦٧٥  
٢٠١١ ٥ ٧  
١/٤



SYR.D0043.004.210\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

*Fax*

3. Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction, 31 March 2011

Syrian Arab Republic  
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces  
Intelligence Department – Branch 243  
Tal Abyad Intelligence Detachment  
Number: 1675/1  
Date: 31/3/2011

To the Head of Branch 243

*In reference to telegram number 7130/1 dated 29/3/2011 concerning the plan of action for Friday, 3/4/2011 to thwart and foil the intentions of those infiltrators, who are enemies of God and the homeland. Sources, delegates and supporters from all social segments, as well as dignitaries are to be directed so that the biggest possible number of citizens true to the homeland and the leader of the homeland can gather at the Friday prayer. They are to be distributed to all mosques in the city and the countryside in order to fulfil their responsibilities to deal with the gangs, opposition elements and mercenaries, prevent them from implementing their schemes and arrest them.*

*The party apparatus – active members and supporters – are to be fully mobilized to work in the district where party sections are found. They should be urged to be present at mosques in large numbers and to pay attention to public spaces (squares, streets, public organizations, etc.).*

*Along with taking measures and implementing the guarding plans and shifts in all party bureaus, organizations and offices, all sources and delegates are to be organized to gather information on the activities of all radical, extremist and suspicious individuals.*

*The functioning of security checkpoints at the entrances of the district is to be organized and streamlined, along with the operation of patrols in all sectors. The elements are to be present at mosques during the Friday prayer with attention to acting wisely and calmly in any situation of emergency.*

*Immediately inform by phone about any suspicious situations.*

*Be informed.*

Head of the Tal Abyad Intelligence Detachment

[Signature]



الجمهورية العربية السورية

القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة  
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٤٣  
مفرزة مخابرات تل أبيب

الرقم / ١٦٧٥ / ١

التاريخ ٢١ / ٢ / ٢٠١١ م

إلى: رئيس لفرع ٤٣

إشارة لبرقيتم رقم ١٢٠١٤١ / ١٢١٢٠ / ٢٩ / ٢٠١١م موضوع خطة العمل ليوم الجمعة ٤ / ٢١ / ٢٠١١م للتدريب وتفعيل الفرص لثوار المندسين أعداء اللسعة والوطن فقد تم توجيه كائنات المصادر والمندسين والمقاتلين من كافة السراخ والفعاليات الاجتماعية لإحضار أكبر عدد ممكن من المواطنين المخلصين للوطن وقائد الوطن لحضور صلاة الجمعة وتوزيعهم على كافة المجموع في المدينة والريف ليتم إكمالها في التصدي للعصايات والقاصر المأويين والمأجورة ومنهم من تنفيذ مخططاتهم والقادر القبض عليهم. كما تم التوجيه لاستنفار كامل الجراز الحزبي عاطف وأرضار للعلن كالأصن منطقة تواجد الفرق الحزبية ومنهم على التواجد في المساجد بأعداد كبيرة والانتباه إلى الأماكن العامة (مساحات شوارع - مؤسسات عامة وغيرها) مع أخذ الحيط وتنفيذ خطة الجرائم والمساوية في كافة الدوائر والمؤسسات والمكاتب الحزبية نشيطا بحافة المصادر والمندسين في جمع المعلومات عن نشاط جميع الأشخاص المخططون والمتشددون والمتسوقون. تنفيذ وتفصيل دور الجواجن الأفضية على مراحل المنطقة وتسيير الدوريات في كافة المقاطعات وتكليف العناصر بحضور خطبة الجمعة في المجموع مع التنبه عليهم على ضرورة الساطين بكافة زهد ورجح أي موقف طارئ - سيتم الإعلام الفورسي هاتفياً عن أي حالة مشبوهة

رجاء الإطلاع

رئيس مفرزة مخابرات تل أبيب  




SYR.D0043.005.100\_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicates translator's commentary.]

4. Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction to all sections and departments, 11 April 2011

Syrian Arab Republic  
General Command of the Army and Army Forces  
Intelligence Department – Branch 243  
No.: /7973/ 1  
Date: 11/ 4/ 2011

Highly Confidential

**To: All Sections and Detachments**

Pursuant to our previous letters whose subject was our request to hold partisan, social and political meetings, you are requested to:

Expand the scope of such meetings so that they include parties of the National Progressive Front, national figures and notables in towns. You are also requested to coordinate with head of the Electoral Committee and mobilize members of the Ba'ath Party in every district and form the so-called popular committees in every district so as to protect towns and defend public departments as well as confront anti-government elements and criminal gangs. Such committees should be supervised by partisan subdivisions and divisions in the said districts, and their work shall be streamlined by the security committee in the districts and under your personal supervision in coordination with Ba'ath party officials.

This is for your information and taking necessary action and informing us of the results of such committees.

Copy to:

The branch deputy head for information and follow-up.

Head of Branch 243

[Signature]

[Stamp: General Command of the Army and Army Forces  
Intelligence Department – Branch 243]

1907

*11/ 4/ 2011*

*Security Instruction*

سري للغاية

جمهورية العربية السورية  
القوة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة  
المخابرات - الفرع ٢٤٣  
١/٧٩٧٢/١  
تاريخ: ٢٠١١/١١/١١

### السري : كافة الأقسام والمقارن

لكتبتنا السابقة موضوع تفعيل اللقاءات الحزبية والاجتماعية والسياسية يطلب إليكم :  
توضيحية هذه اللقاءات لتشمل أحزاب الجبهة الوطنية التقدمية والشخصيات الوطنية والاختيارية  
بغية والتنسيق مع رئيس اللجنة الانتخابية واستنفار الجهاز الحزبي في كل منطقة وتشكيل  
مجلس باللجان الشعبية في كل منطقة لتشكيل حصناً وخذقاً مدافعاً عن البلدة وحماية مؤسساتها  
والكميدي للعناصر المناوئة والعصابات المجرمة على أن تكون بإشراف الفرق والشعب الحزبية  
في هذه المناطق ويتم تفعيل عملها من قبل اللجان الأمنية في المناطق وبإشرافكم الشخصي مع  
المسؤولين الحزبيين .

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم وإعلامنا نتائج عمل هذه اللجان

رئيس الفرع للاطلاع المتابعة

رئيس الفرع ٢٤٣



تعليقات أستاذ

١٩٠٧  
١١ / ٤

SYR.D0183.003.010\_ET

5. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 18 April 2011, disseminated by Military Intelligence Branch 294 Circular, 20 April 2011

FROM:  
Syrian Arab Republic  
General Command of the Army and  
Armed Forces  
Intelligence Department – Branch 294  
No.: /38846/294  
Date: 20/4/2011

FAX NO. :

Apr. 21 2011 12:27PM P1  
Highly Confidential – Immediate  
Exclusively for the Head of the  
Branch

(Circular)

The following appeared in the letter of the Regional Command no. /378/ of 18/4/2011:

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting headed by Comrade Regional Secretary during which it discussed the security and political situation and arrived at the following conclusions:

1- The time of tolerance and meeting demands is over, due to the persistence of saboteurs and conspirators in relying on our policy to raise the ceiling of their demands and hostile practices and to use all methods of militarization as well as weapons to stir sectarian strife.

2- Multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators, saboteurs of security and vandals, as follows:

a- Do not release any detainee, refer detainees to the judiciary.

b- Counter with weapons those who carry weapons against the state, while ensuring that civilians are not harmed.

c- Issue instructions to confiscate unlicensed motorcycles, as well as licensed one used as a means of militarization or transportation for those who carry arms, (the areas and details shall be agreed with the Ministry of Interior).

d- Arrest known offenders, place them in prison and refer them to the judiciary without raids.

e- Mechanism for confronting demonstrations:

- An equipped police force should be prepared to stop demonstrations, with the security [agencies] behind it. Demonstrations should be prepared by the Party and organizations to confront them if necessary, according to the situation.

- Armed forces should not be called in unless in cases of extreme need and for specific tasks.

- Tasks, responsibilities and the mechanism for cooperation between the different authorities should be precisely defined.

3- Create Supreme Committees in the regions, consisting of a member of the Command, high-level military chief and a security chief, to plan, implement and command, and to which all military, security and party authorities in the region should be subordinate, as follows:

- A committee for the Central Region.

- A committee for the Coastal Region.

- The Central Crisis Management Cell shall exercise this function in Damascus and Rural Damascus.

4- Prioritize the Central Region while cooling down the rest of the regions.

5- Role of the Party apparatus (Party organizations, popular organizations and trade unions):

- Train selected personnel on confronting demonstrators, as well as on the use of weapons.

- Establish round-the-clock shifts in Party headquarters.

- Ensure a limited reserve at the Party apparatus and organizations which can be increased as needed in each governorate.



SYR.D0183.003.011\_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicates translator's commentary.]

- Contribute to countering anti-government demonstrations.
  - Stage pro-government demonstrations as requested by and according to the situation in each governorate.
  - Monitor the state of the population and report suspects and inciters, and potentially apprehend and hand them to the security [agencies] and the army.
  - Incorporate trained personnel in units with commands so that their intervention be well-organized.
- 6- Hold a meeting with the syndicates and explain to them their tasks, and that non-compliance with result in them being held accountable according to the syndicate's law and general laws.
- 7- Inform university directors to issue circulars to students on the prohibition of demonstrations at universities according to the law and all offenders will be suspended from the university.
- 8- Role of the media:
- Guide military and civilian media delegations at the sites of events so as they film the event and broadcast the footage quickly after producing and preparing the appropriate commentary on behalf of a dedicated media cell, preferably jointly with the Political Administration of the Armed Forces and under the constant coordination with the security [agencies] and the armed forces.
  - Review banners, terms and expressions that appear and remove those that are not useful. Use concepts and terms ascribed to the crimes that appear in the Penal Code.
  - Implement innovative ways to respond to anti-government media based on audio and visual documentation.
  - Clarify the cases that are considered illegal.
  - The public, as well as saboteurs, should understand that we stand before a stage when the law will be implemented rigorously and without laxity, in order to preserve the security of the nation, the citizens and the public order.
  - Focus on criticizing and condemning saboteurs by all segments of the population.
- 9- Hold a special meeting of the Central Crisis Management Cell to make arrangements for facing the possibility of demonstrations on Friday.

Be informed, act accordingly and abide by the content.

[Signature]  
2/4

Head of the Intelligence Department  
[Signature]  
[Stamp: General Command of the Army and Armed Forces\*20 16\*Intelligence Department]

Sent to:

- Office of the Head of the Intelligence Department: be informed.
- Office of the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department: be informed.
- Branches of the Intelligence Department: be informed and act accordingly.

FROM:

FAX NO.:

Apr. 21 2011 12:24PM P1



سري للغاية - فوري  
خاص برئيس الفرع



الجمهورية العربية السورية  
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة  
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٩٤  
الرقم : ٢٩٤/٣٨٨٤٦/  
التاريخ : ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠

### (تعميم)

ورد بكتاب القيادة القطرية رقم /٣٧٨/ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٤/١٨ مايلى:


عقدت خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية اجتماعاً برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري وناقشت الوضع الأمني والسياسي وتوصلت إلى النتائج التالية :

- ١ - انتهاء مرحلة التسامح وتبديع المطالب، نظراً لإمعان المخربين والمتآمرين في الاعتماد على سياستنا ورفع سقف مطالبهم وممارساتهم العدائية واستخدام كافة وسائل التجييش وكذلك السلاح وإثارة الفتنة الطائفية.
- ٢ - المواجهة المتعددة الجوانب للمتظاهرين والعابثين بالأمن والمخربين بما في ذلك:
  - أ - عدم الإفراج عن أي موقوف وإحالة الموقوفين للقضاء.
  - ب - التصدي بالسلاح لمن يحملون السلاح في وجه الدولة مع الحرص على عدم إيذاء المدنيين.
  - ج - إصدار تعليمات بمصادرة الدراجات النارية غير المرخصة، وكذلك المرخصة ملها والتي تُستخدم كواسطة للتجييش أو نقل من يحملون سلاحاً، (يتفق على المناطق والتفاصيل مع وزارة الداخلية).
  - د - إلقاء القبض على المرتكبين المعروفين وإيداعهم السجن وإحالتهم للقضاء بدون مدامات.
  - هـ - آلية مواجهة التظاهرات:
- يجب إعداد الشرطة المجهزة لصد المظاهرات وخلفها الأمن، مع إعداد مظاهرات من قبل الحزب والمنظمات للمواجهة إذا اقتضى الأمر وحسب الموقف.
- عدم إقحام القوات المسلحة إلا في حالات اضطرارية وبمهام محددة.
- التحديد الدقيق للمهام والمسؤوليات وآلية التعاون بين الجهات المختلفة.
- ٣ - تشكيل لجان عليا في المناطق مؤلفة من عضو قيادة ومسؤول عسكري رفيع المستوى ومسؤول أمني، للتخطيط والتنفيذ والقيادة تخضع لها كل الجهات العسكرية والأمنية والحزبية في المنطقة ومنها:
  - لجنة للمنطقة الوسطى.
  - لجنة للمنطقة الساحلية.
  - تمارس خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية هذه المهمة في دمشق وريف دمشق.
  - ٤ - معالجة المنطقة الوسطى كأفضلية مع تبريد باقي المناطق.
  - ٥ - دور الجهاز الحزبي (منظمات الحزب، المنظمات الشعبية والنقابات المهنية):
  - تدريب العناصر المقررة على مواجهة المتظاهرين، وكذلك على استخدام السلاح.
  - المناوئة المستمرة في المقرات الحزبية.
  - وجود احتياط محدود لدى الجهاز الحزبي والمنظمات يمكن زيادته حسب الوضع في كل محافظة.

- المتابعة في العتدي للتظاهر في المعادي.
- القيام بتظاهرات التأييد حسب الطلب وموقف كل محافظة.
- رصد الحالة الشعبية والإعلام عن المشبوهين والمحرضين وربما ضبطهم وتقديمهم للأمن والجيش.
- تأطير العناصر المدربة في وحدات لها قيادة ليكون تدخلها منظماً.
- ٦ - عقد اجتماع مع النقابات وإفهامهم مهامهم وإن المخالفين سوف يحاسبون وفق قانون النقابة والقوانين العامة.
- ٧ - إبلاغ رؤساء الجامعات بالتعميم على الطلبة بأن التظاهر في الجامعة ممنوع حسب القانون وكل مخالف سوف يفصل من الجامعة.
- ٨ - دور الإعلام:
- توجيه البعثات الإعلامية العسكرية والمدنية في مواقع الحدث وتصويره لبث اللقطات بشكل سريع بعد إخراجها وإعداد التعليق المناسب من قبل خلية إعلامية متخصصة ويفضل أن تكون مشتركة مع الإدارة السياسية في القوات المسلحة، والتنسيق الدائم مع الأمن والقوات المسلحة.
- إعادة النظر باللافتات والمصطلحات والتعابير التي تظهر وإلغاء غير المفيد منها، واستخدام المفاهيم والمصطلحات المستندة إلى الجرائم الواردة في قانون العقوبات.
- تطبيق أساليب مبتكرة للرد على الإعلام المعادي مستندة إلى التوثيق بالصوت والصورة.
- توضيح الحالات التي تعتبر مخالفة للقانون.
- يجب أن يفهم المواطن وكذلك المخربون أننا أمام مرحلة سيطبق فيها القانون بدقة ودون تهاون، للمحافظة على أمن الوطن والمواطن والنظام العام.
- التركيز على تعرية المخربين وإدانتهم من كل فئات الشعب.
- ٩ - عقد اجتماع خاص لخلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية لوضع ترتيبات مواجهة احتمالات التظاهر يوم الجمعة.

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم والتفقد بمضمونه

رئيس شعبة المخابرات



٤ / ٤

المرسل إليهم:

- مكتب رئيس شعبة المخابرات : يرجى الاطلاع.
- مكتب نائب رئيس شعبة المخابرات : يرجى الاطلاع.
- أفرع شعبة المخابرات : للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم .

SYR.D0043.004.093\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

[Illegible]-2011 08:27 From: 051218858 To: 022730300 Page [illegible]  
FROM: FAX NO.: Aug. 18 2011 09:43PM P1  
*Mr. Staff Brigadier General*  
*Kindly be informed*  
Syrian Arab Republic *To be circulated and act* Highly Confidential—  
General Command of the *accordingly* Immediate  
Army and Armed Forces [Signature]  
Intelligence Department— *18/8*  
Branch 294  
Number: /83646/294  
Date: 17/8/2011

To: Head of Branch ( )

We have received the letter of Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau No. /521/A.Q of 15/8/2011 on continuing to uncover coordination committees by means of investigations and the arrest of all of their members in order to put an end to demonstrations in the country's governorates.

The letter is based on the decision of the Central Crisis Management Committee No. /441/ of 14/8/2011 and is pursuant to circular No. none/8/A.Q of 6/8/2011, paragraph /3/ thereof, with regard to the pursuit of members of coordination committees.

➤ Enclosed is a copy of circular No. none/8/A.Q of 6/8/2011.

To be informed and act accordingly.

[Signature]  
*17/8*

Head of the Intelligence Department  
[Signature]  
[Stamp: General Command of the Army and  
Armed Forces\*Intelligence Department]

Copy to:

- Bureau of the Head of the Intelligence Department.
- Bureau of the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department.
- Branches of the Intelligence Department.

SYR.D0043.004.094\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

6. Head of the NSB to the Secretaries of the Ba'ath Party in Hama, Damascus Countryside, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, Idleb and Dar'a governorates, 06 August 2011

1 [illegible number in 051218858 To: 022730300 Page: [illegible in English]-AUG-2011 English]

08:27 From:

FROM:

FAX NO.:

Aug. 18 2011

09:43PM P2

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

One Arab Nation

Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command

With an Eternal Message

National Security Bureau

Highly Confidential—Immediate

\*\*\*

Number: None/8/National Security

Date: 6/8/2011

((Comrade Secretary of the Party Branch in the Governorate of Hama—Rural Damascus—Deir ez-Zor—Homs—Idleb—Dar'a))

Head of the Security Committee

Arab Greetings:

In its meeting held in Damascus on Friday 5/8/2011, the Central Crisis Management Cell discussed the gravity and consequences of the laxness in handling the crisis in the region, and the poor coordination and cooperation among security agencies in sharing information and the results of the ongoing investigations, which prolongs the events and increases the human and material losses, and allows armed gangs to keep perpetrating hijackings, lootings, killings and intimidating the public.

**Therefore, you are requested to:**

- 1- Launch daily joint security-military campaigns in key security sectors of your choice as per security priorities. All security branches should participate in the campaigns to raid the locations of persons wanted for crimes of sabotage, killing, assaulting citizens and attacking their properties and government establishments. You are requested to arrest such persons, particularly those who are inciting people to demonstrate, funders of demonstrators, members of coordination committees who organize demonstrations, conspirers who communicate with people abroad to keep demonstrations ongoing and those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and international organizations.
- 2- Once each sector has been cleansed of wanted persons, you are requested to maintain control of the sector by organizing security and party presence in the sector in cooperation with the city district committee, popular organizations, dignitaries, and influential supporters, so that no wanted person can seek shelter there again.
- 3- Establish a joint investigation committee at the governorate level that includes representatives from all security branches and the Criminal Security Branch. All persons arrested in security campaigns shall be referred to this committee for interrogation. The results of these interrogations shall be sent to all security branches so that they can be used in identifying and seriously pursuing new targets, with an interest in investigations to find and arrest members of local coordination committees.
- 4- Supply the Head of the National Security Bureau with a daily report on the results of the search, including the names of wanted persons who are arrested, seized weapons, the losses resulting from the security campaign and an overall evaluation of the campaign results.
- 5- Periodically supply the National Security Bureau with names of personnel who fail to confront armed gangs, those who are involved in destructive activity, and names of those whose weapons are seized by members of armed gangs.

**We hope you will comply with this request in order to hasten the ending of the crisis and restore safety and security to the citizens.**

**Eternity to Our Message**

**Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau**

[Signature]

[Illegible stamp]



FAX NO. :

FROM :

سيد العبدون  
مدير الاعلام  
تتبع  
٨/١٧

سري للغاية - فوري

الجمهورية العربية السورية  
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة  
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٩٤  
الرقم: ٢٩٤/٨٣٦٤٦/  
التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٨/١٧

إلى: رئيس الفرع ( )

ورد كتاب الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي رقم ٢١/٨/١٥ أ.ق. تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/١٥ المنظمن متابعة كشف  
اللجان التنسيقية من خلال التحقيقات ، وتوقيف كافة أعضائها ، لإنهاء حالة التظاهر في محافظات القنيطرة .  
وبذلك استناداً لقرار اللجنة المركزية لإدارة الأزمة رقم ٤٤١/ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/١٤ ، ولاحقاً للتعميم رقم  
بلا/٨/١٧ أ.ق. تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/٦ الفقرة ٣/ منه ، فيما يتعلق بملاحقة أعضاء التنسيقيات .

« ربطاً : صورة عن التعميم رقم بلا/٨/١٧ أ.ق. تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/٦

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم

رئيس شعبة المخابرات



٨/١٧

نسخة إلى:

- مكتب رئيس شعبة المخابرات .
- مكتب نائب رئيس شعبة المخابرات.
- أفرع شعبة المخابرات .



FROM :

FAX NO. :

Aug. 18 2011 05:43PM F2

أمة عربية واحدة  
طامة وسالة خالدة  
سري - فوري

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي  
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية  
مكتب الأمن القومي

\*\*\*\*

لرقسم: بلا/٨/أق

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٨/٦

« الرفيق أمين فرع الحزب في محافظة حماه - ريف دمشق - دير الزور - حمص - ادلب - درعا »  
رئيس اللجنة الأمنية

كعبة عربية:

ناقشت خلية إدارة الأزمة المركزية بدمشق في اجتماعها يوم الجمعة ٢٠١١/٨/٥ خطورة وتداعيات التراخي في معالجة الأزمة التي يمر بها القطر، وضعف التنسيق والتعاون بين الأجهزة الأمنية في تبادل المعلومات ونتائج التحقيقات الجارية مما يزيد في الفترة الزمنية للأحداث ويزيد بالخسائر البشرية والمادية وينجح للعصابات المسلحة أن تزداد في غيها بممارسة أعمال السلب والنهب والقتل وترويع المواطنين إذا بدلب إليكم مايلي:

١- تنظيم حملات يومية أمنية - عسكرية مشتركة لقطاعات أمنية هامة تختارونها حسب الأولوية الأمنية بمشاركة بها كافة الفروع الأمنية لمداومة أماكن تواجد المطلوبين بجرائم التخريب والقتل والاعتداء على المواطنين وممتلكاتهم، والمؤسسات الحكومية وتوقيفهم وخاصة المحرضين على التظاهر والمواطنين للمتظاهرين، وأعضاء التنسيقيات الذين ينظمون التظاهرات، والعملاء الذين يواصلون مع الخارج للاستمرار بالتظاهر، وتشويه صورة سورية في الإعلام الخارجي والمؤسسات الدولية .

٢- بعد تنظيف كل قطاع من المطلوبين يجب استمرار السيطرة عليه بتنظيم التواجد الأمني والحزبي فيه بالتعاون مع لجنة الحي، والمنظمات الشعبية، والوجهاء، والمتنفذين المؤيدين، كي لا يؤدي إليه أي مطلوب مجدداً.

٣- تشكيل لجنة تحقيق مشتركة في المحافظة تضم ممثلين عن الفروع الأمنية، وفرع الأمن الجنائي وحال إليها كافة الموقوفين في الحملات الأمنية للتحقيق معهم وتعميم نتائج التحقيق على كافة الفروع الأمنية لاستثمارها في توزيع الأهداف الجديدة والجديّة في ملاحقتهم، مع الاهتمام بالتحقيقات لتوصّل إلى أعضاء التنسيقيات المحلية وتوقيفهم.

٤- موافاة رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي يومياً بتقرير عن نتائج التفتيش يتضمن أسماء المطلوبين السنين يتم توقيفهم، والأسلحة المصادرة، والخسائر الناجمة عن الحملة الأمنية، والتقييم العام لنتائج الحملة.

٥- موافاة مكتب الأمن القومي دورياً بأسماء العناصر المتخاذلين في مواجهة العصابات المسلحة، والذين يساهمون في النشاط الهدام، وأسماء المستولى على سلاحهم من قبل أفراد العصابات المسلحة.

نأمل التقيد بالمطلوب للإسراع في إنهاء الأزمة وعودة الأمن والطمأنينة للمواطنين  
والخلود لرسالتنا

الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي



BYR.D0043.004.094

SYR.D0183.003.012\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

7. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party  
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command  
No.: 379

One Arab Nation  
Mission

With an Eternal

Date: 20/4/2011

Highly Confidential

To be kept with the person in charge in person

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell met on 20/4/2011, headed by the Comrade Regional Secretary, and continued its examination of the security and political situation. It arrived at the following conclusions:

- 1- The facts show that the perpetrators of demonstrations, sit-ins, assassinations, killings and sabotage are constantly developing their methods and plans to intimidate the public and force them to join them, by using all sorts of ways to weaken the public's trust in the state and its ability to confront them. They are planning demonstrations for Friday in several cities and will perhaps pass the infection of demonstrating to other cities with stirring up sectarian strife.
- 2- A new phase should be started to counter conspirators by initiating the use of force against them as of this date. It is necessary to find a solution for the battle as well as to demonstrate the power and capacity of the state.
- 3- Detailed plans should be developed to counter the possibilities of armed and unarmed demonstrations and sit-ins, especially in the areas of Dar'a – Damascus and Rural Damascus – Homs. Plans will be developed under the supervision of the National Security Bureau today and tomorrow. The necessary assistance will be requested from the Armed Forces in coordination with the command of the army (according to given instructions).
- 4- The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces will develop overarching plans based on the scenario of a possible spreading of demonstrations and hostile action on a wide scale in all governorates. Measures should be taken and cooperation organized with the implementing authorities, in order to implement a part or all of them as the situation develops.
- 5- Some military units should be mobilized according to given instructions.
- 6- The Armed Forces should issue a statement about assassinations and the killing of militaries, indicating the pursuit of perpetrators by all means and bringing them to justice in order for them to receive just punishment.
- 7- Using all detailed means and methods, based on the situation, when surrounding an area, raiding suspects, or countering an anti-government demonstration. (According to the instructions given at the meeting).
- 8- Arresting wanted persons suspected of being involved in sabotage, killing, planning criminal acts and stirring up strife at the instruction of external actors.

SYR.D0183.003.013\_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

- 9- Focusing security on inquiry, investigation and monitoring to arrive at documented findings to present in the media.
- 10- The deceased should be buried without demonstrations or assemblies. The families of the deceased should pledge to this before the bodies are released to them.
- 11- The Central Crisis Management Cell should hold daily meetings.
- 12- Demonstrating students should be suspended in compliance with university laws and regulations.
- 13- Motorcycles are forbidden entry in accordance with the instructions given to the Minister of Interior.
- 14- Confirming the provisions of item /8/ of the previous minutes on the role of the media in coordination with the Political Administration of the Armed Forces, and the Moral Guidance Administration of the Ministry of Interior based on the instructions given to the ministers.
- 15- Reporting the general picture and decisions to the Supreme Command Committees and the Governor of Dar'a.
- 16- Reinforcing the Ministry of Interior with personnel based on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense.
- 17- The Assistant Regional Secretary shall coordinate the role of the Party and of organizations in the developed plans, and report the instructions to the Party and organizations as instructed.
- 18- Highlighting the wishes of members of the public calling for state intervention against conspirators and finding a solution of the battle against them in order to reassure them of the safety of their own and their children's lives and the possibility of resuming their normal lives safely.

**19- Cancelling the Popular Committees.**

Be informed and act accordingly, each within their own jurisdiction.

Assistant Regional Secretary  
[Signature]

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي  
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية

الرقم: ٣٧٩

سري للغاية

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠

يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

### محضر اجتماع

- اجتمعت خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية بتاريخ ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠ برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري وتابعت دراسة الوضع الأني والسياسي وتوصلت إلى مايلي:
- ١- تشير الوقائع إلى أن منفذي التظاهرات والاعتصامات والاعتقالات والقتل والتخريب ماضون في تطوير أساليبهم وخططهم بهدف ترهيب المواطنين وإرغامهم على الانضمام إليهم باستخدام كافة الأساليب لإضعاف ثقة المواطنين بالدولة وقدرتها على مواجهتهم، وهم يخططون لتظاهرات يوم الجمعة في عدد من المدن وربما سيحاولون نقل عدوى التظاهر إلى مدن أخرى مع إثارة الفتنة الطائفية.
  - ٢- لا بد من بدء مرحلة جديدة لمواجهة المتآمرين بالمبادرة إلى استخدام القوة ضدهم اعتباراً من تاريخه، ومن الضروري حسم المعركة وإبراز قوة الدولة وقدرتها.
  - ٣- وضع خطط مفصلة لمواجهة احتمالات التظاهر المسلح وغير المسلح والاعتصام، وخاصة في مناطق درعا - دمشق وريفها - حمص، يتم وضع الخطط بإشراف مكتب الأمن القومي اليوم وغداً، وتطلب المساعدة الضرورية من القوات المسلحة بالتنسيق مع قيادة الجيش (حسب التوجيهات المعطاة).
  - ٤- تضع القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة خطاً شاملاً استناداً لسيناريو احتمال انتشار التظاهرات والأعمال العدائية على نحو واسع في المحافظات كافة، وتتخذ الإجراءات، وينظم التعاون مع الجهات المنفذة، وذلك لتنفيذ قسم منها أو كلها حسب الموقف المتشكل.
  - ٥- تحريك بعض الوحدات العسكرية حسب التوجيهات المعطاة.
  - ٦- يصدر عن القوات المسلحة بيان حول اغتيالات وقتل العسكريين يشير إلى ملاحقة الجناة بكافة الوسائل وجلبهم للعنيلة لينالوا القصاص العادل.
  - ٧- استخدام كل الأساليب والوسائل التفصيلية حسب الموقف عند محاصرة منطقة، أو مداممة مشبوهين، أو التصدي لتظاهرة معادية. (وفق التوجيهات التي أعطيت في الاجتماع).
  - ٨- توقيف المطلوبين من المشتبه بتورطهم في أعمال التخريب والقتل والتخطيط لأعمال إجرامية وخلق الفتن بإيعاز من الجهات الخارجية.



- ٩- تركيز الأمن في الاستعلام والتحقيق والمتابعة على استخلاص نتائج موثقة لعرضها في الإعلام.
- ١٠- يتم دفن المتوفين دون تظاهر أو تجمعات، ويتعهد ثوو المتوفين بذلك قبل تسليمهم الجثامين.
- ١١- عقد اجتماعات يومية لخلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية.
- ١٢- فصل الطلبة المتظاهرين حسب القوانين والأنظمة الجامعية.
- ١٣- منع دخول الدرجات حسب التوجيه المعطى لوزير الداخلية.
- ١٤- التأكيد على ما جاء في البند /٨/ من المحضر السابق حول دور الإعلام بالتنسيق مع الإدارة السياسية في القوات المسلحة، وإدارة التوجيه المعنوي في وزارة الداخلية وفق التوجيه المعطى للوزراء.
- ١٥- إبلاغ الصورة العمة والقرارات إلى اللجان القيادية العليا و محافظ درعا.
- ١٦- دعم وزارة الداخلية بالعناصر حسب مقترح وزير الدفاع.
- ١٧- ينسق الأمين القطري المساعد دور الحزب والمنظمات في الخطط المعدة ويبلغ التوجيهات إلى الحزب والمنظمات حسب التوجيه المعطى.
- ١٨- إبراز رغبات المواطنين المطالبين بتدخل الدولة ضد المتآمرين وحسم المعركة ضدهم حتى يطمئنون على أرواحهم وأولادهم، واستئناف حياتهم الطبيعية بأمان.
- ١٩- إلغاء اللجان الشعبية.

يرجى الاطلاع وتنفيذ كل فيما يخصه.

الأمين القطري المساعد





Follow us for updates of CIJA's work and achievements:



The Commission for International  
Justice and Accountability



@CIJAOnline



@CIJAOnline

Support CIJA through a donation:

**DONATE**

<https://cijaonline.org/donate>

[cija-syria-paramilitaries.org](https://cija-syria-paramilitaries.org)