

A night photograph of a cityscape, likely in Syria, featuring a prominent minaret and numerous satellite dishes on the rooftops. The scene is illuminated by warm, orange light, possibly from streetlights or building lights, against a dark sky.

BEHIND THE CURTAIN: UNRAVELLING THE BUREAUCRACY OF SYRIA'S MACHINERY OF DEATH

An Evidence -Based Report

December 2023

<https://cija-syria-regime.org>



Commission for International Justice and Accountability

The Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation dedicated to furthering criminal justice efforts through investigations, in order to prevent the loss and destruction of vital evidence for the purpose of supporting prosecutorial efforts to end impunity, whether at the domestic or international level.

© Commission for International Justice and Accountability, December 2023

Multimedia report: <https://cija-syria-homs.org>

The multimedia report was designed by The Stories Communication

Suggested citation:

Commission for International Justice and Accountability, "Behind the Curtain: Unravelling the bureaucracy of Syria's machinery of death", December 2023



CJAonline.org



CJAOnline



The Commission for International Justice and Accountability

BEHIND THE CURTAIN:

Unravelling the
bureaucracy of Syria's
machinery of death

In the tumultuous early days of 2011, as Syrians dared to rise against the iron grip of the Assad Regime they knew that they were up against a menacing state apparatus poised to monitor, arrest and interrogate them.

In the shadows, as the revolution grew, CIJA investigators embarked on a silent and painstaking task – to get the evidence that would allow for the Syrian Regime high-ranking perpetrators of war crimes to be identified. They got much more than that. Over the course of a decade they defied all odds to unearth a staggering trove of more than 1.3 million pages of Regime-issued documents. These pages were not just ink and paper: they were a narrative of unhinged power, an intricate web of orders, instructions, circulars, reports and studies that flowed through the chains of command laying bare the extreme measures to which the Regime would resort to maintain its iron grip on the nation.

The Syrian Regime denied the early reports of torture, mass arrests and murders. The government primarily attributed the violence reported in 2011 to what they characterised as “armed terrorist groups” They claimed that these groups were responsible for initiating the violence and destabilising the country. This narrative allowed the government to justify the use of force as a means to restore order and protect national security. Where crimes were acknowledged, they were attributed to rogue individuals rather than state policy.

But the Regime's own documents paint a different picture. As this report shows, the Syrian Regime knew that the demonstrators demanded freedom and democracy. Yet it formulated and then implemented policies to forcefully suppress opposition activity from early 2011. In doing so, the Regime – at its highest level - knew it was targeting civilians, many of them children, across the protesting governorates; it knew its reaction was so forceful that its own bureaucracy complained

about the mounting number of dead, and did nothing to stop, prevent or punish those responsible. This report focuses on three distinct changes in the Regime's strategy to quash the protests. In three separate Acts – played out in April, August and November 2011 – the Regime escalated its tactics to unimaginable levels, casting a dark shadow over the aspirations of the Syrians yearning for freedom.



PROLOGUE

“no compromise or middle way”

Photo credit: AFP

The Syrian crisis developed against the backdrop of the wave of demonstrations, protests and coups against the authoritarian regimes that swept through a number of Middle East states. Demonstrations in Syria started in the first weeks of 2011.

At the outset, the government’s response was overseen by the National Security Bureau (NSB), a long-standing state security body responsible for coordinating the four intelligence/security agencies, whose membership consisted of the Head of the NSB and the Heads of each agency (Military Intelligence, Air-Force Intelligence, General Intelligence and Political Security).

They relied on the police, the army, the Ba’ath Party and other loyalists to monitor, confront, detain and interrogate protesters, supporters and members of opposition groups. These measures were designed to break up and repress the opposition and prevent the spread of anti-Regime activity. By doing so, the Regime calculated that it could maintain its exclusive control of the state and remain in power

Decisions from NSB were communicated down the chain of command across the country by the heads of security agencies. A Military Intelligence communication to all its detachments refers to an early March NSB meeting at which the demands of the protesters for freedom, democracy and an end to corruption were seen as a threat and were to be targeted immediately by the intelligence agencies.


“Based on what transpired in the meetings of the National Security Bureau regarding the disturbances and events in some Arab countries witnessing youth revolutions calling for change, democracy, freedoms and reforms aimed at creating job opportunities for young men, improving living standards and fighting corruption, there have been attempts made by the opposition in Syria, civil society committees, human rights organisations inside and outside Syria and other suspicious parties to create similar conditions in Syria through mobilising and inciting the youth in Syria against the government. Such attempts were made using social networking sites, graffiti, distributions of bulletins and leaflets and other secret mechanisms to urge the youth to organise demonstrations and sit-ins”

**Military Intelligence Branch 243 Communication to all Sections and Detachments,
12 March 2011**

Information and intelligence gathering intensified. The Head of the Political Security Department in Damascus instituted a nationwide reporting system, whereby heads of the governate level political security branches were to provide detailed daily reports at 16:00 each day. The Reports were required to include detailed statements about any protest or riot along with the “names of the persons against whom legal measures have been taken and those who were arrested amongst the troublemakers, activists and instigators to protests.”

Yet demonstrations spread across Syria quickly, growing in size, frequency, geographic spread as well as intensity.

BASHAR AL-ASSAD
President of the Syrian Arab Republic
Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party
Commander in Chief of the Army and
Armed Forces



ACT I: APRIL 2011

“Demonstrate the power and capacity of the State”

Apparently dissatisfied with the efficiency of NSB's efforts to coordinate the response to protests, on 27 March 2011 Syria's President Bashar Assad directed the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party to establish the Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC). Key members included the heads of the national security and intelligence agencies, the Interior Minister and the Defence Minister, who were tasked with planning, directing and managing the Regime's nationwide response to the protests, while the NSB distributed and oversaw its instructions and decisions.

Five days later Assad made the first public address in the wake of the protests, delivered to the National Assembly on 31 March 2011, President Assad characterised the demonstrations as part of an international conspiracy against Syria and their suppression as a patriotic duty:

“[there can be] no compromise or middle way in this”

President Assad’s Address to the National Assembly, 31 March 2011

A leader with vast, un-checked powers, Assad’s statement to the National Assembly was a public definition of state policy towards the protests that had been shaped by months of surveillance, interrogations and analysis by the security/intelligence apparatus. And the CCMC was the body to oversee it with final approval from Assad.

Evidence collected and analysed by CIJA shows that the CCMC met daily, to gather and centralise information from the governorates, to address events, formulate policies, issue instructions and review implementation by the security agencies and military. Decisions were noted in minutes of each meeting, which were provided to Assad for approval and disseminated out through the security and military apparatus. Reports on their implementation filtered back up their respective chains of command, often at great speed.

The CCMC received information (from which it then formulated the overall security response) from the intelligence/security bodies, military, police and the governorate level joint security bodies (called Security Committees). It then disseminated decisions and directives back down various chains of command, principally through the National Security Bureau (NSB), the Regional Command of the Ba’ath Party, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence.

In mid-April 2011, the CCMC developed a more aggressive policy to suppress protesters and opposition figures. CIJA-obtained documentation shows that between 18-20 April 2011 two key CCMC meetings took place. The documents singled out demonstrators and students as key targets of the policy and draw in the full force of the state against them. Distinct roles were allocated to the Ba'ath Party apparatus, to syndicates, university directors and the media, while the CCMC authorised Governorate Security Committees to deploy police and security agencies. The response was to be reinforced by loyalist paramilitaries as well as military troops, laying the groundwork for the future military response and descent into armed conflict.

The first iteration of the new policy was made on 18 April 2011, where the CCMC decision declared that the “time of tolerance and meeting demands is over.” It called for a “multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators” which included prolonged detention of those already arrested, the arrest of known “offenders”, authorisation of the use of weapons in certain conditions and the seizure of motorbikes. Moreover, a multi-faceted mechanism to confront demonstrations was instituted. Equipped police should stop protests, with security forces behind them, presumably to arrest those confronted by the police; counter demonstrations should be prepared to confront demonstrators; different authorities should cooperate to ensure a carefully defined response; and finally, the role of the armed forces was authorised for specific tasks and in cases of “extreme need”.

“1. The time of tolerance and meeting demands is over, due to the persistence of saboteurs and conspirators in relying on our policy to raise the ceiling of their demands and hostile practices and to use all methods of militarization as well as weapons to stir sectarian strife.

2. Multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators, saboteurs of security and vandals, as follows:

a- Do not release any detainee, refer detainees to the judiciary.

b- Counter with weapons those who carry weapons against the state, while ensuring that civilians are not harmed.

c- Issue instructions to confiscate unlicensed motorcycles, as well as licensed one used as a means of militarization or transportation for those who carry arms, (the areas and details shall be agreed with the Ministry of Interior).

d- Arrest known offenders, place them in prison and refer them to the judiciary without raids.

e- Mechanism for confronting demonstrations:

- An equipped police force should be prepared to stop demonstrations, with the security [agencies] behind it.

Demonstrations should be prepared by the Party and organizations to confront them if necessary, according to the situation.

- Armed forces should not be called in unless in cases of extreme need and for specific tasks.

- Tasks, responsibilities and the mechanism for cooperation between the different authorities should be precisely defined.

General Command of the Army Circular, reporting the CCMC meeting instructions, 18 April 2011, distributed on 20 April 2011

The effect was immediate. The following day, a violent and now notorious attack on protesters at the Homs Clock Tower took place with the CCMC daily report noting that a number of protesters were shot and killed.

Read our report “[The Strangulation of Homs](#)” to see how the Regime escalated their response to protesters and organised opposition, leading to the siege and destruction of Homs.

Two days later, on April 20, the CCMC issued another instruction, directing that the use of force be used immediately against “counter conspirators” which should also “demonstrate the power and capacity of the State”. Key constraints of the order issued two days earlier were removed. Military units were now to be mobilized and instructed; the general command of the Syrian Armed Forces was instructed to develop overarching plans to confront wide-scale protests across the governorates; and raids and widespread arrests of “suspects” were now authorised. Chillingly, the families of those killed would be required to pledge that no demonstrations or assemblies would take place during the burial, before the bodies of their loved ones would be released to them.

2- A new phase should be started to counter conspirators by initiating the use of force against them as of this date. It is necessary to find a solution for the battle as well as to demonstrate the power and capacity of the state.

3- Detailed plans should be developed to counter the possibilities of armed and unarmed demonstrations and sit-ins, especially in the areas of Dar'a – Damascus and Rural Damascus – Homs. Plans will be developed under the supervision of the National Security Bureau today and tomorrow. The necessary assistance will be requested from the Armed Forces in coordination with the command of the army (according to given instructions).

4- The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces will develop overarching plans based on the scenario of a possible spreading of demonstrations and hostile action on a wide scale in all governorates. Measures should be taken and cooperation organized with the implementing authorities, in order to implement a part or all of them as the situation develops.

5- Some military units should be mobilized according to given instructions.

7- Using all detailed means and methods, based on the situation, when surrounding an area, raiding suspects, or countering an anti-government demonstration. (According to the instructions given at the meeting).

8- Arresting wanted persons suspected of being involved in sabotage, killing, planning criminal acts and stirring up strife at the instruction of external actors.


10- The deceased should be buried without demonstrations or assemblies. The families of the deceased should pledge to this before the bodies are released to them.

Extracts from CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011

These measures did nothing to quell the protests, which surged across the country. On Friday 22 April 2011, dubbed the “Great Friday” by protesters, thousands demonstrated across the country. The Regime responded with lethal force: Al Jazeera reported the killing of at least 100 protesters in Dar’a alone while the CCMC daily report listed at least the deaths of approximately 107 individuals.

The following day, CCMC meeting minutes show its members – including the Ba’ath Party Assistant Regional Secretary, the Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior, Minister of Information, Head of the National Security Bureau, the Heads of all four security agencies and Deputy Chief of Staff from the Army – forensically examining incidents from the “Great Friday”, issuing requests and sharing in the decision making.

The policies, developed by the CCMC and signed off by Assad, set the stage not only for a surge of state killings at the demonstrations but also for what would soon become a tsunami of mass arrests. For its effective implementation, the Regime could rely on a hydra of old and new national and local structures.



INTERMISSION I:

The command and control structure

Documents collected by CIJA’s investigators show that the CCMC exercised effective command and control of the vast number of state structures, from the high-level NSB down to subordinated local branches and units, and that they maintained control through the use of directives, circulars, instructions, reports and visits made by senior figures to governorates.

National Security Bureau

Documented references indicate that the NSB sat between the CCMC and the governorate intelligence/security branches, overseeing the implementation of CCMC instructions and decisions. Information and instructions issued by the CCMC were disseminated via the NSB to the various intelligence/security departments down through these various chains of command, to the branches, detachments and sections at the governorate, district, and sub-district levels.

The intelligence/security agencies were also able to send information back to the NSB through the same intelligence/security chains.

Security apparatus

The Regime operates a large and extremely pervasive intelligence and security apparatus divided into four key bodies: Military Intelligence, Air-Force Intelligence, General (sometimes referred to as ‘State’) Intelligence and Political Security. In terms of organisation and structure, the agencies shared many features. They all maintain a Department (or Directorate) headquarters in Damascus and had subordinate branches operating in the various governorates of the country.

The web of intelligence and security formations, branches, sections and units carried out a wide range of tasks. In general, they collected and disseminated security and intelligence information that they then passed up and down their respective chains and on to other security bodies. The information they collected and shared dealt with an array of individuals and groups deemed a threat to the Regime, external threats and information on a variety of individual citizens and organisations within the country. From the very beginning of the current crisis, the information collected was notably wide ranging, while targeting individuals suspected of carrying out specific roles. This included individuals who were suspected of being members of or connected to opposition groups, demonstrators, members of opposition coordination committees, media activity and/or those sending material to media channels or communicating with media deemed as hostile to the Regime. The Regime placed particular importance on media activity, an example of which can be seen some months later in the conflict, when a ‘Special Task Force’ within Military Intelligence appeared to have been established to specifically target Facebook users in order to collect information on opposition activity.




Diagram of multiple reporting lines

Security Committees

Being a part of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party also allowed for a chain to run from the NSB to the wider governorate level security apparatus via the governorate Security Committees.

The Security Committees provided an important mechanism by which the Regime could ensure that information was sent to and disseminated across the governorates, that plans and directives could be sent from the national leadership (the CCMC and NSB) and that these plans and decisions were implemented by all the relevant governorate-level security bodies. The Security Committees also facilitated a flow of information between the various intelligence/security, political and military bodies within the governorate by acting as a key coordinating body for all security related issues.

Documentary evidence indicates that the Security Committees within the various governorates operated along similar lines to one another. The governorate Ba'ath Party Secretary was normally the Head (or Chairman) of the Security Committee with additional representation from the political leadership normally being added through the presence of the Governor. The Heads of the various governorate security/intelligence branches and the chief (or head) of the governorate police were members and often some military representation was noted.

Despite the activity of the CCMC, NSB and the Security Committees in suppressing the opposition during the spring and summer months of 2011 the security situation in Syria was not resolved, in fact it significantly worsened. Attacks on demonstrators, large scale arrests of opposition members, media activists and co-ordinators as well as the implementation of forceful military and security operations led to a hardening of opposition support and the gradual growth and escalation of armed opposition activity to defend opposition areas and attack security elements. In turn, the Regime ratcheted up their own response.

Joint Investigation Committees

In August 2011 the CCMC issued instructions for joint investigative committees (JICs) to be set up in “hot” governorates. The aim was to have all individuals detained in an intensified security campaign referred to JICs for interrogation and for the information obtained to be circulated to all security branches. The committees were made up of a representative of each of the four security intelligence agencies as well as a representative of the criminal security branch of the police. JICs were a wide net into which the Syrian security apparatus dumped tens of thousands of Syrians who were subjected to multiple types of torture and abuse resulting in deaths and continued disappearance of an enormous number of detained population.

Military and Security Chiefs

Replacement of the head of CCMC in October 2011 signified another change in state policy of repression. In “hot” areas of Idleb, Homs, Hama and Dar’a, where opposition activity was particularly strong, the role of the regular governorate Security Committee changed around the autumn of 2011 with the appointment of senior military officials to command the security forces in the governorate. It appeared that the senior leadership of the Regime believed that the Security Committees had not been able to fully control the worsening security situation and there was a need to further militarise the response. These new Military and Security Chiefs were appointed as an attempt to better co-ordinate all the security operations in the governorate, especially in response to the growth and activity of armed opposition group. The Military and Security Chief would consider recommendations from the intelligence/security Branches prior to authorisation for further action.



ACT II: AUGUST 2011

“Addressing poor coordination and cooperation”

This structure became the backbone of the Regime’s overall security response together with the Syrian Armed Forces and Baath party and other militia groups. Over the following months, Assad and the CCMC presided over, implemented and further refined it as they sought to regain control of the country.

Despite the increased security measures, of continued arrest operations, mobilization and use of Ba’athist and other loyalists and the deployment of the military, the situation throughout the governorates continued to deteriorate over the summer. In response, the Regime began to further

review and strengthen their security response, in August 2011. They did this by attempting to rectify perceived weaknesses, by reorganising the security apparatus and command structures it utilised as well as by formulating, disseminating and implementing clearer national level plans targeting particular groups within the opposition.

Clear evidence of this can be seen in an instruction issued by the Head of the NSB following a CCMC meeting. On 05 August, the CCMC met and discussed the gravity of the crisis in the country and concluded that “laxness in handling the crisis” and “poor coordination and cooperation among security agencies in sharing information and the results of the ongoing investigations” was contributing to a prolongation of the conflict.

As a result of this meeting, the following day, the Head of the NSB issued an instruction to the governorate Ba’ath Party Secretaries (i.e. the Heads of the Security Committees) in Hama, Rural Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, Idleb and Dar’a governorates to implement a series of tasks.

The order clearly identified the groups that were to be targeted in joint military/security operations:

Launch daily joint security-military campaigns in key security sectors of your choice as per security priorities. All security branches should participate in the campaigns to raid the locations of persons wanted for crimes of sabotage, killing, assaulting citizens and attacking their properties and government establishments. You are requested to arrest such persons, particularly those who are inciting people to demonstrate, funders of demonstrators, members of coordination committees who organize demonstrations, conspirers who communicate with people abroad to keep demonstrations ongoing and those

who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and international organizations.

CCMC Circular, 06 August 2011, distributed by Military Intelligence Branch 294, 17 August 2011

The order set up an infrastructure for what was to become a bureaucratic machinery overseeing the mass arrest and torture of targeted individuals from the identified groups on industrial scale. They were to be arrested and interrogated by members of specialist investigations bodies established in the governorates consisting of elements from each of the security/intelligence agencies and the Criminal Security. The interrogation reports were required to identify new targets within the groups of interest who were then to be pursued themselves:

Establish a joint investigation committee at the governorate level that includes representatives from all security branches and the Criminal Security Branch. All persons arrested in security campaigns shall be referred to this committee for interrogation. The results of these interrogations shall be sent to all security branches so that they can be used in identifying and seriously pursuing new targets, with an interest in investigations to find and arrest members of local coordination committees

CCMC Circular, 06 August 2011, distributed by Military Intelligence Branch 294, 17 August 2011

Decisions on the exact nature and location of where the joint-security operations were to be conducted was delegated down to the governorates and once areas were ‘cleansed’ they were to be secured with both security and ‘party’ (i.e. loyalist/Ba’athist paramilitary) presence. Information gained was to be passed between agencies and the Head of the NSB (and by implication the CCMC) was to be kept informed of the results through regular reports.

Within days of its issuance, the CCMC instruction was widely disseminated by the Regime’s security agencies throughout the country. Although the NSB circular of 06 August 2011

(containing the CCMC instruction) was addressed to only six governorates, the instruction was in fact disseminated to all the governorates:

5th	Five-point instruction issued by CCMC to Heads of Security Committees in Damascus, Dar'a Deir ez-Zour, Hama, Homs and Idleb governorates
6th	Head of NSB disseminates the instruction to Heads of Security Committees in all 14 governorates
8th	Head of Military Intelligence Branch 243 transmits the instruction to all Military Intelligence Units in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa
15th	Head of Military Intelligence Branch 222 transmits the instruction to all Military Intelligence Units in Al-Hasakeh
16th	Head of Political Security transmits the instruction to all Political Security Branches
17th	Head of Military Intelligence transmits the instructions to all Military Intelligence Branches
22th	Head of Ar-Raqqa Political Security Branch replies to Head of Political Security confirming implementation of instruction
25th	CCMC sends Heads of General Security and Political Security to Idleb and Homs to oversee security operations
29th	Deir-ez-Zor Security Committee decides to establish a joint security strike force to raid and arrest armed men and protesters
31th	Head of Military Intelligence transmits 29 August Deir-ez-Zor Security Committee decisions to all Military Intelligence Units in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa
31th	Head of Political Security instructs all Political Security Branch Heads to open investigation committees in their respective governorates

Table 1: Timeline illustrating dissemination of 5 August 2011 CCMC instruction via the NSB, Security Agencies and Security Committees in selected governorates

Many other documents show strict adherence to the language and wishes of the CCMC leadership, from orders disseminating the instruction down the chain of command as well as reports back up the chain of command. Such is the example set in this instruction from the head of Branch 243 to branch detachments in Deir Al Zour and Ar-Raqqa on 08 August 2011:

1- Conduct daily joint security-military campaigns in the neighbourhoods of (Deir Al Zour and Arraqa) cities, each in their area of responsibility, in order to detain armed men who are wanted for crimes of killing citizens and assaulting their property and assaulting government establishments. You are particularly requested to arrest inciters of demonstrations, financiers of demonstrators,

members of coordination committees who organize the demonstrations and conspirers who communicate with foreign parties to continue the demonstrations and tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and international organizations.

2- Once all wanted persons in each sector have been arrested, you are requested to continue controlling each sector through organizing security and partisan presence in it in cooperation with the neighbourhood's committees, popular organizations and pro-regime dignitaries and people with influence, so that wanted person would no longer seek shelter in the said neighbourhoods.

3- Supply the branch head with a daily report on the search results including the names of wanted persons who have been arrested, seized weapons and losses incurred as a result of the security campaign as well as a general evaluation of the work results.

4- Supply the branch head with daily lists of the names of security agents who fail to confront armed gangs.

Military Intelligence Branch 243 instruction, 08 August 2011

The effect was immediate and chilling.

Arrest records secured by CIJA show that the dissemination of the CCMC instruction *via* the NSB and security agencies resulted in a systematic and coordinated campaign of arrests and detention by each of the above-mentioned security agencies. Similarly, the interrogation reports obtained by CIJA, were sent up the chain of command by the Joint Investigation Committees, pursuant to the CCMC instruction. They are filled with names of tens of thousands of alleged persons of interest, accompanied with details obtained from interrogations. In many cases, the lists contain no indication of any criminal offences that the arrestees were alleged to have committed, and arrests

included many juveniles as well as elderly persons. In some instances, the same individual appears in a number of detainee lists generated over a period of time.

Targeting the media

As well as opposition leaders and coordination committee members, Regime security elements continued to focus on opposition media activists – those who “conspire with people abroad” – along with the reporting of the conflict in social and traditional media. In May, the Head of the NSB wrote to the Head of the Political Security Department, and requested that the NSB be supplied with:

“the information that has been available from your interrogation of detainees who incited demonstrations and those who had contacts with foreign bodies, whether they are media bodies or plotters, or bodies which took part in funding and arming demonstrators, in addition to information on the volume of funding and armament and their sources.”

NSB Instruction to the Head of the Political Security Department, 23 May 2011

The policy was clearly supported by President Assad himself. A summary of his remarks from an Iftar feast, given to scholars and clerics on 24 August 2011 was distributed by the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, where it was reported that:

“The use by media of voice messages, video clips and hypocritical eyewitnesses is a psychological warfare aimed at creating a state of internal chaos and influencing the spirits of Syrians, and that national unity is the only guarantee for Syria and its people in the face of malicious plots and the only assurance to save Syrian blood, and a guarantee for restoring security and stability. Scholars and clerics have to contribute to achieving that.”

Ba'ath Party Regional Command Report, 03 September 2011, dispatched on 11 September 2011

Shortly after the 06 August policy, a series of specialised units were created to monitor and respond to media content and social media users. In mid-August the CCMC instructed the Minister of Information to establish a 'Media Monitoring Cell', while a few weeks later, a "Special Task Force" appears to have been operational within Military Intelligence, to monitor and identify opposition members using Facebook.

1. Creating a Crisis Management Cell and a Media Monitoring Cell at the Ministry of Information assigned the mission of:

- Collecting and analyzing information.*
- Developing appropriate measures and responses.*
- Supplying the Central Crisis Management Cell with the results of media monitoring, analyses, conclusions and recommendations in a daily report to the Central Cell.*

2. Harnessing the activity of members of the press and media and friends, and facilitating their tasks on the ground.

CCMC Instruction to the Minister of Information, 16 August 2011

Another example, from an intelligence report from Military Intelligence Branch 290 in Aleppo shows how the security branches acted on the provision of such information, usually through the arrest and interrogation of those named individuals. The report provided information on 12 individuals that had been arrested the previous day, including those who had posted anti-Regime comments or broadcast demonstrations on social media:

2- , mother's first name , born in 1990, Kuwait (originally from Aleppo (Second-year student at Aleppo University's electrical institute) Wanted by us for inciting demonstrations and posting comments offending the supreme political leadership on Facebook (under interrogation).

5- , mother's first name , born in 1984, Aleppo. His name appeared in the statement of one of the referred individuals to the Investigation Committee of Branch 291. He was said to be attending meetings with the intention to incite demonstrations and told the referred individual to provide live-broadcast cameras to give to the demonstrators in the town of Andan (referred to Branch 291).

8- , mother's first name , born in 1987, Ar-Raqqa Suspicious security situation. We confiscated his taxi, a Verna car, license plate number /660243—Ar- Raqqa) with a laptop inside containing clips of the demonstrations in the cities of Hama and Dar'a and clips offending the supreme political leadership. There were also one digital camera and two mobiles phones (he was referred to the Aleppo 1st Attorney General through the Aleppo Criminal Security Branch).

**Military Intelligence Branch 290 Report to the Head of the Military Intelligence
(via Branch 291), 20 September 2011 [C-116]**



INTERMISSION II:

High level visitors

Photo credit: REUTERS/Stringer

The ferocity and depth of security measures resulted in a strengthening of the opposition’s response, leading in turn to the establishment of armed opposition groups, the takeover of territory and kinetic engagement with Regime security forces. At each turn, the Regime further militarised its response, first by hardening its policy, then by deploying senior military and security leaders to lead operations in the “hot” governorates.

In parallel, the CCMC continued to escalate its direct control over the “hot” governorates. By the end of September, senior-most Regime leaders were leading special operations against civilians in numerous districts and governorates areas, including in Jabal al-Zawiya (a district in Idleb

governorate), Idleb, Al-Madiq Castle (a district of Hama Governorate), Hama, Homs, Deir-ez-Zour and Al Ghouta.

Documents in CIJA's possession show that the CCMC ordered the heads of the security agencies, government ministers and military leaders to visit or deploy to key areas, where they were instructed to coordinate, supervise or implement special operations as well as raids, to propose measures to control areas following pre-planned military operations from the field.

An early example can be seen on 13 August 2011, when the CCMC issued orders for the heads of the security agencies to visit restive areas, to lead their branches in implementing CCMC orders and to propose measures to control areas that had been secured by the army, "once the army implements its mission", while Ministers were also to visit and provide help:

Assign heads of security agencies to visit the hottest zones to lead the branches of agencies on the ground. They shall propose measures to control the situation in the governorates once the army implements its mission.

Assign ministers to visit hot-zone governorates according to priority, to meet with the people and provide help [...]

To keep monitoring the pursuit of terrorists, instigators and offenders, arrest those with a criminal past and keep them under constant control

CCMC Meeting Minutes, 13 August 2011

Twelve days later, the CMCC repeated its order, dispatching Ministers alongside heads of the security agencies to "visit the hottest zones" in order to lead "on the ground." The Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior were instructed to oversee and implement special joint

operations that had been planned in Idleb and Hama, while the heads of Political Intelligence and General Intelligence were deployed to lead security operations in Idleb and Homs:

2. Conducting the necessary coordination between Comrade Deputy General Commander – Minister of Defense and Comrade Minister of Interior, to implement the special plan for the joint operation that will be carried out in the adjacent districts of the governorates of Idleb and Hama.

4. Assigning Comrade Head of the Political Security Department to the governorate of Homs to lead the work of security branches on the ground and to contribute to the successful implementation of the plan developed to control the situation in the governorate of Homs.

5. Assigning Comrade Head of the State Security Directorate to the Idleb governorate to command security branches on the ground.

6. Assigning Comrade Minister of Interior to supervise the completion of security procedures in the governorate of Hama.

CCMC Meeting Minutes of 24 August 2011, distributed 25 August 2011 [C-173]

Less than two weeks later, the CMCC expanded its orders to assign senior-most leaders to ever-growing restive areas, including Deir es-Zor, Jabal al-Zawiya, Al-Madiq Castle and Al-Ghouta, while ordering further visits or follow-up from those assigned to Homs, Idleb and Hama, to supervise security personnel's implementation of operations and to meet with the local commanders in Idleb and Hama "to check the raid and inspection plan" they set up:

1- Assign Comrade Head of the Intelligence Department to supervise security personnel's implementation of missions assigned to them in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor. Comrade Head of the Political Security Department is to follow up on the mission assigned to him in the governorate of Homs.

2- Assign the Comrade Director of the General Intelligence Directorate to visit the governorate of Idleb starting on 4/9/2011 to supervise security personnel's implementation of the missions in the governorate of Idleb and give special attention to the district of Jabal al-Zawiya.

4- Assign the Imad Minister of Defense and Comrade Major General Minister of Interior to check the raid and inspection plan set up by the commanders in the district of Jabal al- Zawiya in the governorate of Idleb, and the district of Al-Madiq Castle in the governorate of Hama; to visit the district as of 6/9/2011 and meet with the relevant commanders; and to supervise the implementation as of 7/9/2011. Assign Comrade Minister of Interior to the mission of supervision from the district of Hama.

7- Assign Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau to set up a plan in coordination with the heads of competent security agencies. Assign the Secretary of the Rural Damascus Governorate Al-Ghouta, investigate the fact that a large number of individuals were killed and injured during the incidents of Friday 2/9/2011, and identify the responsible parties.

CCMC Meeting Minutes of 03 September, distributed 04 September 2011

By mid-autumn, the Regime's command and control structure became more militarised. The head of the CCMC was replaced by Imad Hassan Turkomani, a former Minister of Defence and Member of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party. Turkomani further militarised the command structures within key governorates, first by deploying CCMC members to supervise specific operations, before appointing senior military officials to lead the governorate level Security Committees in specific "hot" governorates and launching large scale military operations.



PHOTO CREDIT: SANA VIA AFP/FILE

The minutes of the CCMC meeting of 22 October detail discussion of a series of wide-ranging issues including detailed instructions to plan for the ‘next phase’ of their work. Turkomani stressed that problems would be meticulously and objectively studied, that every issue would be “soundly analysed”, solution-oriented conclusions reached, decisions taken and recommendations would be raised to the President for ratification.

New work mechanisms would be presented and the implementation of decisions and plans would be followed by “intervention” when dysfunction was noted. The importance of seeking to “create a

welcoming environment for implementing elements”, methods “to win the public opinion” and “render residents cooperative” was discussed.

Discussions at this meeting also centred on the weaknesses of the security apparatus and the “importance of binding security agencies to fully and seriously implement” the tasks of the CCMC. The value of fieldwork was studied and the need for the CCMC to move to some crisis areas “for a day or two to study the field situation and radically solve the problem” was highlighted.

The CCMC made several decisions at this key meeting including that: CCMC personnel were to carry out field visits to supervise the implementation of tasks; circulars and written orders were not to be considered sufficient in the implementation of instructions; tasks were to be clearly specified; and “implementing elements” were to set work plans, file follow-up reports and monitor the implementation of plans.

The message from this particular CCMC meeting was clear: with a new chairman in place, the CCMC was attempting to control a deteriorating security situation by tightening procedures and further gripping the security response.

See: CCMC Meeting Minutes, 22 October 2011, distributed 23 October 2011

Four days later, a decision was taken to nominate commanders to supervise the decisions taken by Security Committees, including the deployment of the Head of Political Security Department to command the security and armed forces in Homs:

The role and importance of implementing decisions made by security committees were examined, and a commander was nominated to be in charge

of supervising the implementation of these decisions by security agencies and military units according to the content of each decision.

[...] The following decisions were made:

2. Appointing Comrade Major General Head of the Political Security Department to command security agencies and armed forces units present in the governorate of Homs, and vesting him with full powers to take the necessary legal measures against any offender or anyone who acts with laxity.

CCMC Meeting Minutes, 26 October 2011, distributed on 27 October 2011

Senior military leaders were deployed to the restive governorates of Idlib, Hama and Homs, to coordinate the military and security responses, operations rooms were established across ministries and governorates, and military vehicles and units were deployed to the most turbulent areas.

In November, an important series of discussions and decisions in the CCMC indicated clearly that the leadership believed additional measures were needed to further strengthen the command and control of security bodies in key governorates. CCMC meeting minutes from 21 November 2011 reveal part of this wider policy transition, where CCMC examined the centralisation of all civilian, military and security personnel active in “hot” governorates under military commanders and ordering the appointment of senior-most military insiders into those roles:

“The meeting proceeded as follows: [...]

Examining the positive impact of appointing military commanders with recognized competence and experience to command operations, especially in hot governorates; vesting them with the power to command all superiors and heads of civil, military and security agencies in the district; and the importance of coming up with creative solutions to end the crisis”.

The following was decided at the conclusion of the meeting: [...]

10- Comrade Deputy General Commander – Minister of Defense will be assigned to propose the appropriate commanders for operations in hot governorates (Idleb – Hama –Homs...etc)

CCMC Meeting Minutes of 21 November 2011, distributed on 22 November 2011

Two days later, the Minister of Defence was instructed “to issue special orders to appoint the commanders with the powers to command the operations in the tense governorates.”

This decision was of critical importance in marking a shift in the command and control of security operations from the civilian/intelligence/security bodies to the military (at least in the governorates that were destabilising and witnessing significant security problems). The national leadership clearly believed that the measures taken in the previous months had not been fully successful and the bodies tasked with controlling the situation had been unable to achieve the goal of suppressing and defeating opposition activity. The situation had evidently deteriorated to such a degree that experienced military commanders needed to take charge.

An Administrative Order from 26 November shows Assad appointing the Syrian Army Special Forces Commander Fuad Ahmad Hammouda as the Military and Security Chief of the Idleb governorate, one of several opposition strongholds:

Major General Fuad Ahmad Hammouda – Special Forces Commander is charged with the command of all military units and formations, the different security forces, the internal security forces and the government and party authorities in Idleb Governorate and is considered head of the security committee.

All above-mentioned bodies are requested to fully comply with the orders and instructions issued by Major General Fuad Ahmad Hammouda - Special Forces Commander. Full cooperation and coordination between those concerned is

requested for the implementation of organised special operations in order to achieve complete success, ensure the security and stability in the governorate and enhance the confidence of the citizens in their army and security forces.

A daily report with all activities carried out in the governorate is to be sent to the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces – Operations Commission.

Field Marshal Bashar Assad

General Commander of the Army and Armed Forces

Administrative Order, 26 November 2011

Similar appointments were made in Homs, where a new role of Military and Security Chief was made and filled by a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army with devastating effects, as well as Dar'a and Hama.

See CIJA's Report "[The Strangulation of Homs](#)"

A wave of brutal attacks followed. Documents in CIJA's possession detail search and arrest raids by Regime forces on towns and villages across Syria. Over an eight-day period in December as the third Arab League peace plan was signed, the CCMC received reports of regular "search and sweep operations" by military, police and security forces in locations across Homs and Dar'a.

A letter from the Head of the Joint Investigative Committee in Hama to the Military and Security Chief – a Major General from the Armed Forces - is illustrative of the brutality that detainees suffered once arrested:

"it is impossible for us to thoroughly interrogate some of the arrestees due to their poor medical condition caused by severe beating which, in some cases, has led to permanent disability while being prolongedly detained at some security agencies before they were handed over to us"



EPILOGUE

PHOTO CREDIT: AFP/SHAAM NEWS NETWORK

The stage for the suffocation of dissent had been set. Through the series of decisions made at the highest level, and approved by the president himself, the Syrian state had set in motion an apparatus of enormous proportions. An apparatus that would swallow up hundreds of thousands of protesters, civilians and unintended revolutionaries who would disappear in the archipelago of torture chambers or wind up dead in the streets and fields of Syria.

ANNEXES

1. Military Intelligence Branch 243 Communication to all Sections and Detachments, 12 March 2011
2. General Command of the Army Circular, reporting the CCMC meeting instructions, 18 April 2011, distributed on 20 April 2011
3. Extracts from CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011
4. CCMC Circular, 06 August 2011, distributed by Military Intelligence Branch 294, 17 August 2011
5. Ba'ath Party Regional Command Report, 03 September 2011, dispatched on 11 September 2011
6. CCMC Instruction to the Minister of Information, 16 August 2011
7. Military Intelligence Branch 290 Report to the Head of the Military Intelligence (via Branch 291), 20 September 2011
8. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 24 August 2011, distributed 25 August 2011
9. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 03 September, distributed 04 September 2011
10. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 22 October 2011, distributed 23 October 2011
11. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 26 October 2011, distributed on 27 October 2011
12. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 21 November 2011, distributed on 22 November 2011
13. Administrative Order, 26 November 2011

SYR.D0043.004.236_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicates translator's commentary.]

1. Military Intelligence Branch 243 Communication to all Sections and Detachments, 12 March 2011
12 MAR 2011 13:19 From: 218858 To: 730300 P. 1/6

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Department - Branch – 243
No.: /5888/1
Date: 12/3/2011

Highly Confidential

To: All Sections and Detachments

Based on what transpired in the meetings of the National Security Bureau regarding the disturbances and events in some Arab countries witnessing youth revolutions calling for change, democracy, freedoms and reforms aimed at creating job opportunities for young men, improving living standards and fighting corruption, there have been attempts made by the opposition in Syria, civil society committees, human rights organisations inside and outside Syria and other suspicious parties to create similar conditions in Syria through mobilising and inciting the youth in Syria against the government. Such attempts were made using social networking sites, graffiti, distributions of bulletins and leaflets and other secret mechanisms to urge the youth to organise demonstrations and sit-ins in Syria under false pretexts which, if ignored, may lead the youth to take to the streets.

In order to avoid the consequences of continued incitement, such as the call for organising the Day of Wrath on 4 and 5 February, and foil the attempts of inciters to exploit any pretext, civil police and security agents are requested not to provoke citizens. This is because any provocation may serve the purposes of Syria's enemies. On the other hand, unstudied administrative decisions taken by ministers and mayors, which affect the daily life of citizens, may lead to creating a crisis. An example of such decisions is the mass demolition of unlicensed buildings, an increase in taxes, fees or prices. All of such decisions may be used as a pretext for incitement, and it was noticed how a quarrel between a policeman and a citizen driving his car in Al Hariqa Market of Damascus on 17 February turned into a demonstration that was covered by Arab and international channels, newspapers and websites. Were it not contained on the spot, the demonstration would have been exploited. Therefore, it is necessary to study the sociological effects of any security related incident which involves citizens, who should not be provoked. And all security apparatuses and civil and military police should comply with the instructions issued by the National Security Bureau concerning the summoning and detention of citizens, as these instruction are aimed at preserving the integrity of security work whose objective is to achieve the stability and security of the country.

This is for your information.

1252
12/3/2011

Security instructions

Head of Branch 243
[Signature]

[Stamp: General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Department - Branch – 243]

الجمهورية العربية السورية

القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة

شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٤٣

الرقم: ١/٥٨٨٨/

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٢/١٤

سري للغاية

إلى : كافة الأقسام والمفارز

استناداً لما جاء في اجتماعات مكتب الأمن القومي حول الاضطرابات والأحداث التي شهدتها ونشدها بعض البلدان العربية التي انفجرت فيها ثورات شبابية تطالب بالتغيير وإرساء الديمقراطية والحريات وإجراء إصلاحات لتوفير فرص العمل للشباب وتحسين مستوى المعيشة ومكافحة الفساد ومحاولة جر سوريا إلى هذه المشاهد خلال ما تقوم به المعارضة في سوريا ولجان المجتمع المدني ومنظمات حقوق الإنسان في الداخل والخارج مع جهات أخرى مشبوهة من سعي حثيث ومستمر لتعبئة وتحريض الشباب داخل سورية ضد السلطة باستخدام مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي في الانترنت والكتابات على الجدران وتوزيع البيانات والمنشورات وآليات أخرى سرية لزج الشباب في تظاهرات واعتصامات داخل سوريا ورغم أن كافة الذرائع واهية إلا أنها تؤدي إلى تداعي بعض الشباب للنزول إلى الشارع .

ولتفادي أعمال التحريض المستمرة منذ الدعوة إلى يوم الغضب في (٥ و٤) شباط الماضي وتفويت الفرص على المحرضين من استغلال أي ذريعة ينبغي عدم استفزاز الشارع حالياً من قبل الشرطة المدنية وعناصر الأمن لأن أي أعمال استفزازية ستخدم أعداء سوريا وحتى القرارات الإدارية التي تصدر عن الوزراء والمحافظين المتعلفة بالمواطنين وتمس حياتهم المعيشية إذا كانت غير مدروسة يمكن أن تؤدي إلى أزمة وكمثال على ذلك صدور أي قرار يهدم مخالفات أبنية جماعية أو زيادة رسوم وضرائب أو رفع أسعار جميعها قد تعتمد كذريعة في التحريض، ولوحظ كيف تحولت حادثة الشجار بين عناصر الشرطة وأحد المواطنين أثناء قيادته سيارته في سوق الحريقة بدمشق في السابع عشر من شباط الماضي إلى مظاهرة تناقلتها الفضائيات العربية والأجنبية والصحف ومواقع الانترنت وكان من الممكن استغلالها لولا تداركها ، لهذا من الضروري دراسة المنعكسات الاجتماعية لأي حادثة أمنية تتعلق بالشارع والمواطن وتجنب استفزاز المواطنين وعلى كافة الأجهزة الأمنية وعناصر الشرطة المدنية والعسكرية التقيد بتعليمات صادرة سابقاً عن مكتب الأمن القومي في مجال الاستدعاء والتوقيف حرصاً على سلامة العمل الأمني والوطني الذي هدفه الأساسي تحقيق الاستقرار والأمن في الوطن .

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم .

رئيس الفرع ٢٤٣

سليمان سبيح

١٤٥٤
٢٠١١/٢/١٤



SYR.D0183.003.010_ET

2. General Command of the Army Circular, reporting the CCMC meeting instructions, 18 April 2011, distributed on 20 April 2011

FROM:
Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and
Armed Forces
Intelligence Department – Branch 294
No.: /38846/294
Date: 20/4/2011

FAX NO. :

Apr. 21 2011 12:27PM P1
Highly Confidential – Immediate
Exclusively for the Head of the
Branch

(Circular)

The following appeared in the letter of the Regional Command no. /378/ of 18/4/2011:

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting headed by Comrade Regional Secretary during which it discussed the security and political situation and arrived at the following conclusions:

1- The time of tolerance and meeting demands is over, due to the persistence of saboteurs and conspirators in relying on our policy to raise the ceiling of their demands and hostile practices and to use all methods of militarization as well as weapons to stir sectarian strife.

2- Multi-faceted confrontation of demonstrators, saboteurs of security and vandals, as follows:

a- Do not release any detainee, refer detainees to the judiciary.

b- Counter with weapons those who carry weapons against the state, while ensuring that civilians are not harmed.

c- Issue instructions to confiscate unlicensed motorcycles, as well as licensed one used as a means of militarization or transportation for those who carry arms, (the areas and details shall be agreed with the Ministry of Interior).

d- Arrest known offenders, place them in prison and refer them to the judiciary without raids.

e- Mechanism for confronting demonstrations:

- An equipped police force should be prepared to stop demonstrations, with the security [agencies] behind it. Demonstrations should be prepared by the Party and organizations to confront them if necessary, according to the situation.

- Armed forces should not be called in unless in cases of extreme need and for specific tasks.

- Tasks, responsibilities and the mechanism for cooperation between the different authorities should be precisely defined.

3- Create Supreme Committees in the regions, consisting of a member of the Command, high-level military chief and a security chief, to plan, implement and command, and to which all military, security and party authorities in the region should be subordinate, as follows:

- A committee for the Central Region.

- A committee for the Coastal Region.

- The Central Crisis Management Cell shall exercise this function in Damascus and Rural Damascus.

4- Prioritize the Central Region while cooling down the rest of the regions.

5- Role of the Party apparatus (Party organizations, popular organizations and trade unions):

- Train selected personnel on confronting demonstrators, as well as on the use of weapons.

- Establish round-the-clock shifts in Party headquarters.

- Ensure a limited reserve at the Party apparatus and organizations which can be increased as needed in each governorate.

SYR.D0183.003.011_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicates translator's commentary.]

- Contribute to countering anti-government demonstrations.
- Stage pro-government demonstrations as requested by and according to the situation in each governorate.
- Monitor the state of the population and report suspects and inciters, and potentially apprehend and hand them to the security [agencies] and the army.
- Incorporate trained personnel in units with commands so that their intervention be well-organized.
- 6- Hold a meeting with the syndicates and explain to them their tasks, and that non-compliance with result in them being held accountable according to the syndicate's law and general laws.
- 7- Inform university directors to issue circulars to students on the prohibition of demonstrations at universities according to the law and all offenders will be suspended from the university.
- 8- Role of the media:
 - Guide military and civilian media delegations at the sites of events so as they film the event and broadcast the footage quickly after producing and preparing the appropriate commentary on behalf of a dedicated media cell, preferably jointly with the Political Administration of the Armed Forces and under the constant coordination with the security [agencies] and the armed forces.
 - Review banners, terms and expressions that appear and remove those that are not useful. Use concepts and terms ascribed to the crimes that appear in the Penal Code.
 - Implement innovative ways to respond to anti-government media based on audio and visual documentation.
 - Clarify the cases that are considered illegal.
 - The public, as well as saboteurs, should understand that we stand before a stage when the law will be implemented rigorously and without laxity, in order to preserve the security of the nation, the citizens and the public order.
 - Focus on criticizing and condemning saboteurs by all segments of the population.
- 9- Hold a special meeting of the Central Crisis Management Cell to make arrangements for facing the possibility of demonstrations on Friday.

Be informed, act accordingly and abide by the content.

[Signature]
2/4

Head of the Intelligence Department
[Signature]
[Stamp: General Command of the Army and Armed Forces*20 16*Intelligence Department]

Sent to:

- Office of the Head of the Intelligence Department: be informed.
- Office of the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department: be informed.
- Branches of the Intelligence Department: be informed and act accordingly.

FROM:

FAX NO.:

Apr. 21 2011 12:24PM P1



سري للغاية - فوري
خاص برئيس الفرع

الجمهورية العربية السورية
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٩٤
الرقم : ٢٩٤/٣٨٨٤٦/
التاريخ : ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠

2

(تعميم)

ورد بكتاب القيادة القطرية رقم /٣٧٨/ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٤/١٨ مايلى:


عقدت خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية اجتماعاً برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري وناقشت الوضع الأمني والسياسي وتوصلت إلى النتائج التالية :

- ١ - انتهاء مرحلة التسامح وتبديع المطالب، نظراً لإمعان المخربين والمتمأمرين في الاعتماد على سياستنا ورفع سقف مطالبهم وممارساتهم العدائية واستخدام كافة وسائل التجييش وكذلك السلاح وإثارة الفتنة الطائفية.
- ٢ - المواجهة المتعددة الجوانب للمتظاهرين والمبايئين بالأمن والمخربين بما في ذلك:
 - أ - عدم الإفراج عن أي موقوف وإحالة الموقوفين للقضاء.
 - ب - التصدي بالسلاح لمن يحملون السلاح في وجه الدولة مع الحرص على عدم إيذاء المدنيين.
 - ج - إصدار تعليمات بمصادرة الدراجات النارية غير المرخصة، وكذلك المرخصة ملها والتي تُستخدم كواسطة للتجييش أو نقل من يحملون سلاحاً، (يتفق على المناطق والتفاصيل مع وزارة الداخلية).
 - د - إلقاء القبض على المرتكبين المعروفين وإيداعهم السجن وإحالتهم للقضاء بدون مدامات.
 - هـ - آلية مواجهة التظاهرات:
- يجب إعداد الشرطة المجهزة لصد المظاهرات وخلفها الأمن، مع إعداد مظاهرات من قبل الحزب والمنظمات للمواجهة إذا اقتضى الأمر وحسب الموقف.
- عدم إقحام القوات المسلحة إلا في حالات اضطرارية وبمهام محددة.
- التحديد الدقيق للمهام والمسؤوليات وآلية التعاون بين الجهات المختلفة.
- ٣ - تشكيل لجان غلبا في المناطق مؤلفة من عضو قيادة ومسؤول عسكري رفيع المستوى ومسؤول أمني، للتخطيط والتنفيذ والقيادة تخضع لها كل الجهات العسكرية والأمنية والحزبية في المنطقة ومنها:
 - لجنة للمنطقة الوسطى.
 - لجنة للمنطقة الساحلية.
 - تمارس خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية هذه المهمة في دمشق وريف دمشق.
 - ٤ - معالجة المنطقة الوسطى كأفضلية مع تبريد باقي المناطق.
 - ٥ - دور الجهاز الحزبي (منظمات الحزب، المنظمات الشعبية والنقابات المهنية):
 - تدريب العناصر المقررة على مواجهة المتظاهرين، وكذلك على استخدام السلاح.
 - المناوئة المستمرة في المقرات الحزبية.
 - وجود احتياط محدود لدى الجهاز الحزبي والمنظمات يمكن زيادته حسب الوضع في كل محافظة.

- القيام بتظاهرات التأييد حسب الطلب وموقف كل محافظة.
- رصد الحالة الشعبية والإعلام عن المشبوهين والمحرضين وربما ضبطهم وتقديمهم للأمن والجيش.
- تأطير العناصر المدربة في وحدات لها قيادة ليكون تدخلها منظماً.
- ٦ - عقد اجتماع مع النقابات وإفهامهم مهامهم وإن المخالفين سوف يحاسبون وفق قانون النقابة والقوانين العامة.
- ٧ - إبلاغ رؤساء الجامعات بالتعميم على الطلبة بأن التظاهر في الجامعة ممنوع حسب القانون وكل مخالف سوف يُفصل من الجامعة.
- ٨ - دور الإعلام:
- توجيه البعثات الإعلامية العسكرية والمدنية في مواقع الحدث وتصويره لبث اللقطات بشكل سريع بعد إخراجها وإعداد التعليق المناسب من قبل خلية إعلامية متخصصة ويُفضل أن تكون مشتركة مع الإدارة السياسية في القوات المسلحة، والتنسيق الدائم مع الأمن والقوات المسلحة.
- إعادة النظر باللافتات والمصطلحات والتعابير التي تظهر وإلغاء غير المفيد منها، واستخدام المفاهيم والمصطلحات المستندة إلى الجرائم الواردة في قانون العقوبات.
- تطبيق أساليب مبتكرة للرد على الإعلام المعادي مستندة إلى التوثيق بالصوت والصورة.
- توضيح الحالات التي تُعتبر مخالفة للقانون.
- يجب أن يفهم المواطن وكذلك المخربون أننا أمام مرحلة سيُطبّق فيها القانون بدقة ودون تهاون، للمحافظة على أمن الوطن والمواطن والنظام العام.
- التركيز على تعرية المخربين وإدانتهم من كل فئات الشعب.
- ٩ - عقد اجتماع خاص لخلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية لوضع ترتيبات مواجهة احتمالات التظاهر يوم الجمعة.

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم والتفيد بمضمونه

رئيس شعبة المخابرات



٤ / ٤

المرسل إليهم:

- مكتب رئيس شعبة المخابرات : يرجى الاطلاع.
- مكتب نائب رئيس شعبة المخابرات : يرجى الاطلاع.
- أفرع شعبة المخابرات : للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم .

SYR.D0183.003.012_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

3. Extracts from CCMC Meeting Minutes, 20 April 2011

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command
No.: 379

Date: 20/4/2011

One Arab Nation
Mission

With an Eternal

Highly Confidential

To be kept with the person in charge in person

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell met on 20/4/2011, headed by the Comrade Regional Secretary, and continued its examination of the security and political situation. It arrived at the following conclusions:

1- The facts show that the perpetrators of demonstrations, sit-ins, assassinations, killings and sabotage are constantly developing their methods and plans to intimidate the public and force them to join them, by using all sorts of ways to weaken the public's trust in the state and its ability to confront them. They are planning demonstrations for Friday in several cities and will perhaps pass the infection of demonstrating to other cities with stirring up sectarian strife.

2- A new phase should be started to counter conspirators by initiating the use of force against them as of this date. It is necessary to find a solution for the battle as well as to demonstrate the power and capacity of the state.

3- Detailed plans should be developed to counter the possibilities of armed and unarmed demonstrations and sit-ins, especially in the areas of Dar'a – Damascus and Rural Damascus – Homs. Plans will be developed under the supervision of the National Security Bureau today and tomorrow. The necessary assistance will be requested from the Armed Forces in coordination with the command of the army (according to given instructions).

4- The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces will develop overarching plans based on the scenario of a possible spreading of demonstrations and hostile action on a wide scale in all governorates. Measures should be taken and cooperation organized with the implementing authorities, in order to implement a part or all of them as the situation develops.

5- Some military units should be mobilized according to given instructions.

6- The Armed Forces should issue a statement about assassinations and the killing of militaries, indicating the pursuit of perpetrators by all means and bringing them to justice in order for them to receive just punishment.

7- Using all detailed means and methods, based on the situation, when surrounding an area, raiding suspects, or countering an anti-government demonstration. (According to the instructions given at the meeting).

8- Arresting wanted persons suspected of being involved in sabotage, killing, planning criminal acts and stirring up strife at the instruction of external actors.

SYR.D0183.003.013_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

9- Focusing security on inquiry, investigation and monitoring to arrive at documented findings to present in the media.

10- The deceased should be buried without demonstrations or assemblies. The families of the deceased should pledge to this before the bodies are released to them.

11- The Central Crisis Management Cell should hold daily meetings.

12- Demonstrating students should be suspended in compliance with university laws and regulations.

13- Motorcycles are forbidden entry in accordance with the instructions given to the Minister of Interior.

14- Confirming the provisions of item /8/ of the previous minutes on the role of the media in coordination with the Political Administration of the Armed Forces, and the Moral Guidance Administration of the Ministry of Interior based on the instructions given to the ministers.

15- Reporting the general picture and decisions to the Supreme Command Committees and the Governor of Dar'a.

16- Reinforcing the Ministry of Interior with personnel based on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense.

17- The Assistant Regional Secretary shall coordinate the role of the Party and of organizations in the developed plans, and report the instructions to the Party and organizations as instructed.

18- Highlighting the wishes of members of the public calling for state intervention against conspirators and finding a solution of the battle against them in order to reassure them of the safety of their own and their children's lives and the possibility of resuming their normal lives safely.

19- Cancelling the Popular Committees.

Be informed and act accordingly, each within their own jurisdiction.

Assistant Regional Secretary
[Signature]

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية

الرقم: ٣٧٩

سري للغاية

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠

يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

محضر اجتماع

اجتمعت خلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية بتاريخ ٢٠١١/٤/٢٠ برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري وتابعت دراسة الوضع الأني والسياسي وتوصلت إلى مايلي:

١- تشير الوقائع إلى أن منفذي التظاهرات والاعتصامات والاعتقالات والقتل والتخريب ماضون في تطوير أساليبهم وخططهم بهدف ترهيب المواطنين وإرغامهم على الانضمام إليهم باستخدام كافة الأساليب لإضعاف ثقة المواطنين بالدولة وقدرتها على مواجهتهم، وهم يخططون لتظاهرات يوم الجمعة في عدد من المدن وربما سيحاولون نقل عدوى التظاهر إلى مدن أخرى مع إثارة الفتنة الطائفية.

٢- لا بد من بدء مرحلة جديدة لمواجهة المتآمرين بالمبادرة إلى استخدام القوة ضدهم اعتباراً من تاريخه، ومن الضروري حسم المعركة وإبراز قوة الدولة وقدرتها.

٣- وضع خطط مفصلة لمواجهة احتمالات التظاهر المسلح وغير المسلح والاعتصام، وخاصة في مناطق درعا - دمشق وريفها - حمص، يتم وضع الخطط بإشراف مكتب الأمن القومي اليوم وغداً، وتطلب المساعدة الضرورية من القوات المسلحة بالتنسيق مع قيادة الجيش (حسب التوجيهات المعطاة).

٤- تضع القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة خطاً شاملاً استناداً لسيناريو احتمال انتشار التظاهرات والأعمال العدائية على نحو واسع في المحافظات كافة، وتتخذ الإجراءات، وينظم التعاون مع الجهات المنفذة، وذلك لتنفيذ قسم منها أو كلها حسب الموقف المتشكل.

٥- تحريك بعض الوحدات العسكرية حسب التوجيهات المعطاة.

٦- يصدر عن القوات المسلحة بيان حول اغتيالات وقتل العسكريين يشير إلى ملاحقة الجناة بكافة الوسائل وجلبهم للعنطة لينالوا القصاص العادل.

٧- استخدام كل الأساليب والوسائل التفصيلية حسب الموقف عند محاصرة منطقة، أو مداممة مشبوهين، أو التصدي لتظاهرة معادية. (وفق التوجيهات التي أعطيت في الاجتماع).

٨- توقيف المطلوبين من المشتبه بتورطهم في أعمال التخريب والقتل والتخطيط لأعمال إجرامية وخلق الفتن بإيعاز من الجهات الخارجية.

٩- تركيز الأمن في الاستعلام والتحقيق والمتابعة على استخلاص نتائج موثقة لعرضها في الإعلام.

١٠- يتم دفن المتوفين دون تظاهر أو تجمعات، ويتعهد ثوو المتوفين بذلك قبل تسليمهم الجثامين.

١١- عقد اجتماعات يومية لخلية إدارة الأزمات المركزية.

١٢- فصل الطلبة المتظاهرين حسب القوانين والأنظمة الجامعية.

١٣- منع دخول الدرجات حسب التوجيه المعطى لوزير الداخلية.

١٤- التأكيد على ما جاء في البند /٨/ من المحضر السابق حول دور الإعلام بالتنسيق مع الإدارة السياسية في القوات المسلحة، وإدارة التوجيه المعنوي في وزارة الداخلية وفق التوجيه المعطى للوزراء.

١٥- إبلاغ الصورة العمة والقرارات إلى اللجان القيادية العليا و محافظ درعا.

١٦- دعم وزارة الداخلية بالعناصر حسب مقترح وزير الدفاع.

١٧- ينسق الأمين القطري المساعد دور الحزب والمنظمات في الخطط المعدة ويبلغ التوجيهات إلى الحزب والمنظمات حسب التوجيه المعطى.

١٨- إبراز رغبات المواطنين المطالبين بتدخل الدولة ضد المتآمرين وحسم المعركة ضدهم حتى يطمئنون على أرواحهم وأولادهم، واستئناف حياتهم الطبيعية بأمان.

١٩- إلغاء اللجان الشعبية.

يرجى الاطلاع وتنفيذ كل فيما يخصه.

الأمين القطري المساعد

SYR.D0043.004.093_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

4. CCMC Circular, 06 August 2011, distributed by Military Intelligence Branch 294, 17 August 2011

[Illegible]-2011 08:27 From: 051218858 To: 022730300 Page [illegible]
FROM: FAX NO.: Aug. 18 2011 09:43PM P1

Mr. Staff Brigadier General

Kindly be informed

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the
Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Department—
Branch 294
Number: /83646/294
Date: 17/8/2011

To be circulated and act

accordingly

[Signature]

18/8

Highly Confidential—

Immediate

To: Head of Branch ()

We have received the letter of Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau No. /521/A.Q of 15/8/2011 on continuing to uncover coordination committees by means of investigations and the arrest of all of their members in order to put an end to demonstrations in the country's governorates.

The letter is based on the decision of the Central Crisis Management Committee No. /441/ of 14/8/2011 and is pursuant to circular No. none/8/A.Q of 6/8/2011, paragraph /3/ thereof, with regard to the pursuit of members of coordination committees.

➤ Enclosed is a copy of circular No. none/8/A.Q of 6/8/2011.

To be informed and act accordingly.

[Signature]
17/8

Head of the Intelligence Department
[Signature]

[Stamp: General Command of the Army and
Armed Forces*Intelligence Department]

Copy to:

- Bureau of the Head of the Intelligence Department.
- Bureau of the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department.
- Branches of the Intelligence Department.

SYR.D0043.004.094_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

1[illegible number in 051218858 To: 022730300 Page: [illegible in
English]-AUG-2011 English]
08:27 From: Aug. 18 2011 09:43PM P2
FROM: Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party One Arab Nation
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command With an Eternal Message
National Security Bureau Highly Confidential—Immediate

Number: None/8/National Security
Date: 6/8/2011

((Comrade Secretary of the Party Branch in the Governorate of Hama—Rural Damascus—Deir ez-Zor—Homs—Idleb—Dar'a))

Head of the Security Committee

Arab Greetings:

In its meeting held in Damascus on Friday 5/8/2011, the Central Crisis Management Cell discussed the gravity and consequences of the laxness in handling the crisis in the region, and the poor coordination and cooperation among security agencies in sharing information and the results of the ongoing investigations, which prolongs the events and increases the human and material losses, and allows armed gangs to keep perpetrating hijackings, lootings, killings and intimidating the public.

Therefore, you are requested to:

- 1- Launch daily joint security-military campaigns in key security sectors of your choice as per security priorities. All security branches should participate in the campaigns to raid the locations of persons wanted for crimes of sabotage, killing, assaulting citizens and attacking their properties and government establishments. You are requested to arrest such persons, particularly those who are inciting people to demonstrate, funders of demonstrators, members of coordination committees who organize demonstrations, conspirers who communicate with people abroad to keep demonstrations ongoing and those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and international organizations.
- 2- Once each sector has been cleansed of wanted persons, you are requested to maintain control of the sector by organizing security and party presence in the sector in cooperation with the city district committee, popular organizations, dignitaries, and influential supporters, so that no wanted person can seek shelter there again.
- 3- Establish a joint investigation committee at the governorate level that includes representatives from all security branches and the Criminal Security Branch. All persons arrested in security campaigns shall be referred to this committee for interrogation. The results of these interrogations shall be sent to all security branches so that they can be used in identifying and seriously pursuing new targets, with an interest in investigations to find and arrest members of local coordination committees.
- 4- Supply the Head of the National Security Bureau with a daily report on the results of the search, including the names of wanted persons who are arrested, seized weapons, the losses resulting from the security campaign and an overall evaluation of the campaign results.
- 5- Periodically supply the National Security Bureau with names of personnel who fail to confront armed gangs, those who are involved in destructive activity, and names of those whose weapons are seized by members of armed gangs.

We hope you will comply with this request in order to hasten the ending of the crisis and restore safety and security to the citizens.

Eternity to Our Message

Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau
[Signature]
[Illegible stamp]

FAX NO. :

سيد السيد
مدير الأبحاث
التتبع (م)

سري للغاية - فوري

الجمهورية العربية السورية
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة
شعبة المخابرات - الفرع ٢٩٤
الرقم: ٢٩٤/٨٣٦٤٦/
التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٨/١٧

إلى: رئيس الفرع ()

ورد كتاب الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي رقم ٢١/٨/١٥ أ.ق. تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/١٥ المنضمن متابعة كشف اللجان التنسيقية من خلال التحقيقات ، وتوقيف كافة أعضائها ، لإنهاء حالة التظاهر في محافظات القنيطرة .
وبذلك استناداً لقرار اللجنة المركزية لإدارة الأزمة رقم ٤٤١/٤ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/١٤ ، ولاحقاً للتعميم رقم بلا/٨/١٦ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/٦ الفقرة ٣/ منه ، فيما يتعلق بملاحقة أعضاء التنسيقيات .

« ربطاً : صورة عن التعميم رقم بلا/٨/١٦ أ.ق تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/٦

للاطلاع وإجراء اللازم

رئيس شعبة المخابرات



٨/١٧

نسخة إلى:

- مكتب رئيس شعبة المخابرات .
- مكتب نائب رئيس شعبة المخابرات.
- أفرع شعبة المخابرات .

FROM :

FAX NO. :

Aug. 18 2011 05:43PM F2

أمة عربية واحدة
طامة رسالة خالدة
سري - فوري

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية
مكتب الأمن القومي

لرقسم: بلا/٨/أق

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٨/٦

« الرفيق أمين فرع الحزب في محافظة حماه - ريف دمشق - دير الزور - حمص - ادلب - درعا »
رئيس اللجنة الأمنية

كعبة عربية:

ناقشت خلية إدارة الأزمة المركزية بدمشق في اجتماعها يوم الجمعة ٢٠١١/٨/٥ خطورة وتداعيات التراخي في معالجة الأزمة التي يمر بها القطر، وضعف التنسيق والتعاون بين الأجهزة الأمنية في تبادل المعلومات ونتائج التحقيقات الجارية مما يزيد في الفترة الزمنية للأحداث ويزيد بالخسائر البشرية والمادية وينجح للعصابات المسلحة أن تزداد في غيها بممارسة أعمال السلب والنهب والقتل وترويع المواطنين إذا بدلب إليكم مايلي:

١- تنظيم حملات يومية أمنية - عسكرية مشتركة لقطاعات أمنية هامة تختارونها حسب الأولوية الأمنية وإشراك بها كافة الفروع الأمنية لمداومة أماكن تواجد المطلوبين بجرائم التخريب والقتل والاعتداء على المواطنين وممتلكاتهم، والمؤسسات الحكومية وتوقيفهم وخاصة المحرضين على التظاهر والمواطنين للمتظاهرين، وأعضاء التنسيقيات الذين ينظمون التظاهرات، والعملاء الذين يواصلون مع الخارج للإستمرار بالتظاهر، وتشويه صورة سورية في الإعلام الخارجي والمؤسسات الدولية .

٢- بعد تنظيف كل قطاع من المطلوبين يجب استمرار السيطرة عليه بتنظيم التواجد الأمني والحزبي فيه بالتعاون مع لجنة الحي، والمنظمات الشعبية، والوجهاء، والمتنفذين المؤيدين، كي لا يأوي إليه أي مطلوب مجدداً.

٣- تشكيل لجنة تحقيق مشتركة في المحافظة تضم ممثلين عن الفروع الأمنية، وفرع الأمن الجنائي بحال إليها كافة الموقوفين في الحملات الأمنية للتحقيق معهم وتعميم نتائج التحقيق على كافة الفروع الأمنية لإستمرارها في توزيع الأهداف الجديدة والجديّة في ملاحقتهم، مع الاهتمام بالتحقيقات لتوصّل إلى أعضاء التنسيقيات المحلية وتوقيفهم.

٤- موافاة رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي يومياً بتقرير عن نتائج التفتيش يتضمن أسماء المطلوبين السنين يتم توقيفهم، والأسلحة المصادرة، والخسائر الناجمة عن الحملة الأمنية، والتقييم العام لنتائج الحملة.

٥- موافاة مكتب الأمن القومي دورياً بأسماء العناصر المتخاضلين في مواجهة العصابات المسلحة، والذين يساهمون في التشاؤم الهدام، وأسماء المستولى على سلاحهم من قبل أفراد العصابات المسلحة.

نأمل التقيد بالمطلوب للإسراع في إنهاء الأزمة وعودة الأمن والطمأنينة للمواطنين
والخلود لرسالتنا

الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي



BYR.D0043.004.094

SYR.D0069.033.001_ET

[Translator's note: Italics indicates handwriting, and brackets indicates translator's commentary.]

5. Ba'ath Party Regional Command Report, 03 September 2011, dispatched on 11 September 2011

754

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

One Arab Nation

[Illegible handwriting]

Syrian Arab Region - Regional Command

With an Eternal Mission

Regional Bureau of the Secretariat

*Book-keeper: distribute to
sections of the Branch*

No.: 586/8/KT

11/9/2011

Date: 3/9/2011

Meeting of President Bashar Al Assad with scholars and clerics

President and Regional Secretary of Ba'ath Party Bashar Al Assad met on Wednesday 24/8/2014 with scholars and clerics during an Iftar Banquet hosted on the occasion of the Holy Month of Ramadan. The meeting was qualitative when His Excellency spoke with much transparency, clarity and accuracy, addressing a number of current issues being experienced by our beloved country. The extemporaneous speech dealt with significant topics aimed at explaining and solving the crisis and highlighting the hidden aspects of it. He asked everyone to shoulder his responsibilities in confronting this crisis, particularly that clerics have an effective social role.

The most significant topics he spoke about can be summed up in the following:

- He called on clerics and officials to shoulder their responsibilities in enhancing national unity among Syrians and participate in the reform process hand in hand.
- He reiterated the historic relations between pan-Arabism and Islam and the significance of maintaining such relations in our society.
- He said that Syria's strength lies in its people who believe that the homeland is like their own home and that sovereignty is their honour, and that national unity was their stronghold which they resort to, and that belief means security and safety and that it is the guarantee for the future of our children.
- Foreign pressure does not stem from the West being keen on the interests of the Syrian people or reforms, but because Syrian became like an obstacle for the West in this region, and they want Syria to give concessions. This will not happen because Syrians throughout their history chose to have their own will and to preserve their sovereignty.
- There are ongoing malicious attempts to divide Syria and the conspiracy is targeting Syria's existence, unity and civilization, and that the successive failure of the West in forcing Syria to give concessions led to escalating the conspiracy against it, and launching unprecedented and fierce media attacks on it.
- The use by media of voice messages, video clips and hypocritical eyewitnesses is a psychological warfare aimed at creating a state of internal chaos and influencing the spirits of Syrians, and that national unity is the only guarantee for Syria and its people in the face of malicious plots and the only assurance to save Syrian blood, and a guarantee for restoring security and stability. Scholars and clerics have to contribute to achieving that.
- Treating the shortcomings which appear in the practices of some of us while dealing with the crisis should not distract our attention from the great exerted efforts and we should not contribute to echoing hostile stances in this regard, because we are all concerned with addressing the shortcomings in our behavior and performance.
- The government will go on with reform in steady steps and such reform establishes for the country's future and that of future generations. Consequently, reform should be planned carefully and built on the basis of the natural needs of society and not our sudden needs. This requires unifying the efforts of everybody, particularly that of clerics who should contribute to such reforms.

[Illegible handwriting]

1272
8/9/2011

SYR.D0069.033.002_ET

Currently, what is happening in Syria is the application of the *Divide and Rule* policy, as well as the practical application of the New Middle East Project, which is led by America and its allies, in order to fragment the region and [*impose its*] hegemony over it. This calls for each free citizen who believes in his homeland to arm himself with the belief and conscience of the unity of his people and his land. Based on that, it is to insist on not employing religion to achieve goals, which have no relation to the essence of true religion, or the high interests of the homeland. Taking that into consideration is a moral national duty.

Indeed, Syria's history has proven its people's persistence, capable of overcoming an ordeal and crises. Its people, with their ability to unite, their civilizational and congenital value, can weather this ongoing crisis, because they truly believe in their homeland, its sovereignty, which is embodied in the Party Branch Secretary, the President **Bashar Al-Assad**.

Regional Command

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission

Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command

- Copy true to the original

Political Department

- Military Party Branches (to be recited during party meetings)

Ideological Preparation and Party Organisation Branch

Section for Ideological Guidance

- The Archivist

Eternity to Our Mission

Comrade Major General Dr. Shaib Suleiman

In charge of the affairs of the Political Department

[Stamp and signature]

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية
مكتب الأمانة القطري
الرقم: ٨/٥٨٦/ق.ط
التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٩/٣

أمة عربية واحدة

ذات رسالة خالدة

٢٠١١/٩/١١

لقاء السيد الرئيس بشار الأسد مع السادة العلماء ورجال الدين

التقى السيد الرئيس بشار الأسد الأمين القطري للحزب يوم الأربعاء ٢٠١١/٨/٢٤ السادة العلماء ورجال الدين، في دعوة لمأدبة الإفطار بمناسبة شهر رمضان الكريم. وكان هذا اللقاء نوعياً، تحدث فيه سيادته بمزيد من الشفافية والوضوح والدقة، متناولاً جملة من القضايا الراهنة التي يمر بها قطرنا الحبيب، وقد تناولت «كلمة التي ارتجلها نقاطاً مهمة ومضيئة لشرح الأزمة وحلها، للوقوف على دقائق وخفايا ما يكمن وراءها، ووجهه إلى ضرورة أن يمارس الجميع ميامه في مواجهة هذه الأزمة ولاسيما رجال الدين، لما لهم من دور اجتماعي فاعل ومؤثر.

ويمكن إبراز أهم النقاط التي تم التطرق إليها بالآتي:

- دعوة الجميع من رجال دين ومسؤولين إلى تحمل مسؤولياتهم في تعزيز اللحمة الوطنية بين أبناء الشعب السوري، والمشاركة في عملية الإصلاح يداً بيد .
- تأكيد العلاقات التاريخية الطبيعية بين العروبة والإسلام، وأهمية الحفاظ عليها في مجتمعاتنا .
- إن قوة سورية بشعبها الذي يؤمن بأن الوطن هو بيته، والسيادة هي شرفه، والوحدة الوطنية هي الحصن الحصين الذي نلجأ إليه، والإيمان هو الأمن والأمان، وهو الضمانة لمستقبل أبنائنا .
- إن الضغوط الخارجية لا تأتي من كون الغرب حريصاً على الشعب السوري، وعلى الإصلاح، بل لأن سورية هي عقدة الغرب في المنطقة، وهم يريدون من سورية أن تقدم التنازلات، وهذا لن يكون، لأن الشعب السوري اختار عبر تاريخه أن تكون له إرادته وسيادته المستقلة .
- هناك محاولات حديثة ما تزال قائمة لتقسيم سورية وتفتيتها، فالمؤامرة تستهدف سورية وجوداً ووحدة، وحضارة، وإن الفشل المتتالي للغرب في النيل من سورية أدى إلى ازدياد المؤامرة عليها، وشن هجمة إعلامية شرسة غير مسبوقة .
- إن استخدام وسائل الإعلام للرسائل الصوتية، ومقاطع الفيديو، وشهود العيان المناهقين، هو حرب نفسية تهدف إلى خلق فوضى داخلية، والتأثير في معنويات المواطن السوري، وإن الوحدة الوطنية وحدها هي التي تحصن سورية وشعبها تجاه المخططات الحاقدة والعميلة، وهي كفيلة بحقق دماء السوريين، وضمان لإعادة الأمن والاستقرار، وعلى العلماء ورجال الدين أن يسهموا في تحقيق ذلك .
- إن تصحيح السلبات التي تظهر في ممارسات البعض منا، أثناء معالجة الأزمة، يجب أن لا يحرف انتباهنا عن الجهود الكبيرة المبذولة، كما يجب أن لا نساهم في ترديد أصداء المواقف المعادية لنا في هذا الشأن، لأننا كلنا معنيون بمواجهة هذه السلبات في سلوكنا وأدائنا .
- إن الدولة ماضية قُدماً في مسيرة الإصلاح بخطوات ثابتة، وهذا الإصلاح يؤسس لمستقبل البلاد ومستقبل الأجيال القادمة، وبالتالي يجب أن يكون مدروساً بعناية، وأن يُبنى على أساس حاجات المجتمع الطبيعية، وليس حاجاته الطارئة، وهذا يستدعي تكاتف جهود الجميع، ولاسيما رجال الدين للمساهمة في هذا الإصلاح.

١٤٧٤
٢٠١٧/٩/١٨

٢

٢٠١٧/٩/١٨

إن ما يجري في سورية تطبيق لسياسة - فرق تمدد - وتطبيق عملي لمشروع الشرق الأوسط الجديد الذي نفوذه أمريكا وحلفاؤها، لتفتيت المنطقة والهيمنة عليها، مما يستدعي من كل مواطن حر مؤمن بوطنه التسلح بالإيمان والوعي بوحدة شعبه وأرضه، وبناءً عليه فإنه يجب الإلحاح على عدم استخدام الدين لتحقيق غايات لا علاقة لها بحقيقة الدين الصحيح، وبمصالح الوطن العليا، واعتبار ذلك واجباً وطنياً وأخلاقياً.

إن تاريخ سورية أثبت على الدوام أن شعبها قادر على تجاوز محنته وأزماته، وهو قادر بوحدته وقيمه الحضارية والخلقية أن يتخطى هذه الأزمة التي يمر بها، لأنه مؤمن إيماناً صادقاً بوطنه وسيادته التي يجسدها الأمين القطري للحزب السيد الرئيس بشار الأسد .

القيادة القطرية

ذات رسالة خالدة

أمة عربية واحدة

- صورة طبق الأصل المرفقة:

- الفروع التحزبية العسكرية (يتلى في الاجتماعات الحزبية).

- المسنّف

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي

القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية

الإدارة السياسية

فرع الإعداد العقائدي والتنظيم الحزبي

قسم التوجيه العقائدي

الرقم: ٤٤ / ع.ت

التاريخ: ٢٠١١/٩/٦

والخلود لرسالتنا

الرفيق اللواء د. شعيب سليمان
المكلف بتسيير أمور الإدارة السياسية



SYR.E0013.002.025_ET

[Translator's note: The star in the margin was handwritten in the original document.]

6. CCMC Instruction to the Minister of Information, 16 August 2011

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command

Regional Bureau of the Secretariat

Central Crisis Management Cell

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission

Number: /3428/30

Date: 16/9/1432 H

16/8/2011

Comrade Minister of Information

Arab Greetings:

The Central Crisis Management Cell decided the following in its meeting held on Saturday 13/8/2011:

- ★ 1. Creating a Crisis Management Cell and a Media Monitoring Cell at the Ministry of Information assigned the mission of:
 - Collecting and analyzing information.
 - Developing appropriate measures and responses.
 - Supplying the Central Crisis Management Cell with the results of media monitoring, analyses, conclusions and recommendations in a daily report to the Central Cell.
- 2. Harnessing the activity of members of the press and media and friends, and facilitating their tasks on the ground.

Eternity to Our Mission

Comrade Assistant Regional Secretary

Head of the Central Crisis Management Cell

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي

الرقم: 30/3428/

القطر السوري- القيادة القطرية

التاريخ: 1432/9/16 هـ

مكتب الأمانة القطري

2011/8/16 م

الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات

6.

الرفيق وزير الإعلام

تحية عربية:

قررت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات في اجتماعها الذي عقد يوم السبت 2011/8/13 مايلي:

1- تشكيل خلية إدارة أزمة وخلية رصد إعلامي في وزارة الإعلام تكلف بمهمة:

- جمع وتحليل المعلومات.
- إعداد الإجراءات والردود المناسبة.
- تزويد الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات بنتائج الرصد الإعلامي وتحليله واستخلاص النتائج والمقترحات، وذلك برفع تقرير يومي إلى الخلية المركزية.

2- استثمار نشاط رجال الصحافة والإعلام والأصدقاء وتسهيل مهامهم على الأرض.

والخود لرسالتنا

الرفيق الأمين القطري المساعد

رئيس الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات

SYR.D0175.008.002_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

7. Military Intelligence Branch 290 Report to the Head of the Military Intelligence (via Branch 291), 20 September 2011
0112135858 Page: 001 of 002 Fax: 20/09/2011 11:47 PM From

Syrian Arab Republic

Highly Confidential

General Command of the Army and Armed Forces

Intelligence Department—Branch /290/

№ /9986/4

Date 20/9/2011

From: Branch 290	To the Bureau of Major General Head of the Intelligence Department through Branch 291/Mail
“Time sent 11:45 PM”	“Time Received 24:00”
Date Sent: 20/9/2011	Date Received: 20/9/2011
Telegram Sent by: <i>Warrant Officer 1st Class Wesam Ahmad</i>	Telegram Received by: <i>Warrant Officer 1st Class Naser Mansour</i>
<p><u>-Subject:</u> -Notification of the arrest of /12/ persons, including /8/ arrested on various counts and /4/ militaries, one of whom does not hold an official permit and /3/ referred to us from Aleppo Military Police Branch on the charge of internal desertion.</p>	
<p><u>-Body of Telegram:</u> -On 19/9/2011 we arrested the following:</p> <p>1- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1982, Idleb Smuggling diesel (referred to the Aleppo Customs Secretariat)</p> <p>2- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1990, Kuwait (originally from Aleppo (Second-year student at Aleppo University's electrical institute) Wanted by us for inciting demonstrations and posting comments offending the supreme political leadership on Facebook (under interrogation).</p> <p>3- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1985, Aleppo Confessing to involvement in two demonstrations in the Aleppo city district of Salah al-Din and chanting slogans for the downfall of the regime (referred to the 1st Attorney General of Aleppo through the Aleppo Criminal Security Branch).</p> <p>4- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1991, Aleppo Participating in the demonstration of the so-called Aleppo Volcano Friday in the city district of Al-Jameiliyya, and telling his friends at Carrefour Mall ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED]) that demonstrating reflects the demonstrators' right to express their opinion (referred to the Aleppo 1st Attorney General through the Aleppo Criminal Security Branch).</p> <p>5- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1984, Aleppo His name appeared in the statement of one of the referred individuals to the Investigation Committee of Branch 291. He was said to be attending meetings with the intention to incite demonstrations and told the referred individual to provide live-broadcast cameras to give to the demonstrators in the town of Andan (referred to Branch 291).</p> <p>6- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1988, Aleppo There has been information that he was inciting demonstrations and distributing flyers (under interrogation).</p> <p>7- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1968, Idleb, Kafrouma, civil registration number 95</p>	

SYR.D0175.008.003_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

To: 0112135858 Page: 002 of 002 Fax: 20/09/2011 11:47 PM From

<p><u>His name appeared in the circular of Branch /294/ № /87832/ of 27/8/2011 that he was wanted for arrest by Branch 271 (he was released and was told to contact the head of Branch 271 since he is wanted by the branch and security agencies in the city of Idleb and the circular issued by them in his concern was going to be settled).</u></p> <p>8- [REDACTED], mother's first name [REDACTED], born in 1987, Ar-Raqqa</p> <p>Suspicious security situation. We confiscated his taxi, a Verna car, license plate number /660243—Ar-Raqqa) with a laptop inside containing clips of the demonstrations in the cities of Hama and Dar'a and clips offending the supreme political leadership. There were also one digital camera and two mobiles phones (he was referred to the Aleppo 1st Attorney General through the Aleppo Criminal Security Branch).</p> <p>-We also arrested /4/ militaries, one of whom does not hold an official permit and /3/ referred to us by the Aleppo Military Police Branch on the charge of internal desertion.</p>	
-Evidence and proof:	-Arrest warrants + statements of arrested individuals
-Reliability of the information:	-100%
<p><u>-Opinion and Recommendation:</u></p> <p>-Since we have proof that the /12/ arrested individuals, who were arrested by us on 19/9/2011, among whom /8/ were arrested on various counts and /4/ militaries one of whom does not hold an official permit and /3/ referred to us by the Aleppo Military Police Branch on the charge of internal desertion (referred to the Aleppo Military Police Branch and a copy of their statement sent to Branch 291/2),</p> <p><u>-Therefore, we recommend:</u></p> <p>-Referring the remaining arrested individuals to the competent local branches and agencies after interrogating them and determining their detention period by the competent judicial authorities, if necessary, based on circular № /5371/248/3 of 2/5/2011;</p> <p><u>-Sending telegrams with suitable recommendations if we arrive at new findings which call for notification during the investigations;</u></p> <p>-Sending a copy of the telegram to Branches (291/2—291/4—271—294—235—248) to be notified.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Be notified and supply us with your decision.</p>	

[*Stamp: General Command of the Army and Armed Forces*20
16*Intelligence Department—
Branch 290] [*Signature: Staff Brigadier General, Head of Branch 290]

-Opinion of Head of Branch 291: *Approved. Contact Branch 271 to supply us with the situation of serial number /7/ Hatem al-Hamadi on their part* [Signature] 20/9

-Opinion of Major General Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department: *Approved* [Signature] 921

-Decision of Major General Head of the Intelligence Department: *Approved* [Signature] 21/9

سيبري للغايات



الجمهورية العربية السورية
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة
شعبة المعاينات - الفرع ٢٩٠ /
الرقم / ٩٩٨٦ / ٤
التاريخ ٢٠١١/٩/٤

7

من: الفرع ٢٩٠	إلى مكتب السوء اللواء رئيس شعبة المعاينات ع/ط الفرع ٢٩٠/ب
توقيت الإرسال: ٢٥ / ١١ / ٢٠١١	توقيت الاستقبال: ٢٤ / ١١ / ٢٠١١
تاريخ الإرسال: ٢٥ / ١١ / ٢٠١١	تاريخ الاستقبال: ٢٤ / ١١ / ٢٠١١
مرسل البرقية: السيد / سامر /	مستقبل البرقية: السيد / مراد /
- الموضوع:	
- إعلام حول توقيف ١٢ / شخص منهم ٨ / موقوفين بجرائم مختلفة و ٤ / عسكريين أحدهم لا يحمل إجازة رسمية و ٣ / أحيلوا إلينا من فرع الشرطة العسكرية بحلب بجرم الفرار الداخلي.	
- نص البرقية:	
- بتاريخ ٢٠١١/٩/١٩ أوقفنا كلاً من:	
١- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٨٢ إدلب.	تخريب ملاوت (أحيل إلى أمانة حمّارك حلب).
٢- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٩٥ الكويت (أصلاً من حلب).	(طالب سنة ثانية معهد كهرباء بجامعة حلب).
مطلوب إلينا بموضوع التحريض على التظاهر وتبوين تعليقات سببة للقيادة السياسية العليا عن موقع الفيس بوك (قيد التحقيق).	
٣- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٨٥ حلب.	اعترافه بالإشتراك بتظاهرات في حي صلاح الدين بمنطقة حلب وترديد هتافات تمادي بإسقاط النظام. (أحيل إلى اخصائي العام الأول بحلب ع/ط فرع الأمن الجنائي بحلب).
٤- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٩١ حلب.	لاشتراكه بتظاهرة ما يسمى جمعة بركان حلب في حي الجميلة وتحدثه أمام زملائه في منزل كازنوز المدعوقين ([Redacted])
(أن التظاهر حق للمتظاهرين للتعبير عن رأيهم (أحيل إلى اخصائي العام الأول بحلب ع/ط فرع الأمن الجنائي بحلب).	
٥- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٨٤ حلب.	ورد اسمه بأقوال أحد المخالين إلى لجنة التحقيق بالفرع ٢٩١ أنه كان يحضر الاجتماعات يقصد التحريض على التظاهر وأنه طلب من المخال تأمين كاميرا بت مباشر من أجل إخطائها للمتظاهرين في بلدة حنتان (أحيل إلى الفرع ٢٩١).
٦- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٨٨ حلب.	وزود بمعلومات تتضمن قيامه بالتحريض على التظاهر وتوزيع المنشورات (قيد التحقيق).
٧- [Redacted] والدة [Redacted] تولد ١٩٦٨ إدلب، كفرومة غب ٩٥.	



زيود اسمه بتعميم الفرع /٢٩٤/ رقم /٨٧٨٣٢٢/ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٨/٢٧ بأنه مطلوب توقيفه لصالح الفرع ٢٧١
(أعلى سبيله وتم تكليفه بمراجعة رئيس الفرع ٢٧٩ كونه مطلوب إليهم وللجهات الأمنية بمدينة إدلب وسيم معالجة
وضع التعيين الصادر بحقه من قبلهم) .

والله **توقد ١٩٨٧ الرقعة .**

للاستشارة بوضعه الأمني ومصادره من سيارة تكسي نوع فورتا تحمل اللوحة رقم /٦٦٠ ٢٤٢٢/ - الرقعة/ بداعليها جهاز
كمبيوتر عمول بحري مقاطع لتظاهرات في مدينة حماه ودرعا ومقاطع شعبة للقيادة السياسية العليا وكاميرا ديجيتال
وجهازين تحليلين (أحيلوا إلى القاضي العام الأول بحلب مع/ ط فرغ الأمن الجنائي بحلب) .

- كما أوقفنا /٤/ عسكريين أحدهم لا يحمل إجازة رسمية و/٣/ أحيلوا إلينا من فرع الشرطة العسكرية بحلب
بجزم القرار الداخلي .

- الأدلة والإبانات :	- مذكرات التوقيف + أقوال الموقوفين .
- خريطة موقوفة المعلومات :	- %١٥٠

الترأي والمقترح :
- كما أنه ثبت لدينا أن الموقوفين وعددهم /٦٢/ موقوف تم توقيفهم من قبلنا بتاريخ ٢٠١١/٩/٢٩
/٨/ موقوفين بجرالم مختلفة و/٤/ عسكريين أحدهم لا يحمل إجازة رسمية و/٣/ أحيلوا إلينا من فرع الشرطة
العسكرية بحلب بجزم القرار الداخلي (أحيلوا إلى فرع الشرطة العسكرية بحلب وتم إرسال نسخة من التوقيف
للفرع /٢/٢٩١) .

لذلك تقترح :
- إحالة باقي الموقوفين إلى الأفرع والجهات الخلية المختصة بعد التحقيق معهم أو تحديد فترة توقيفهم من الجهات
الكفائية المختصة إذا اقتضت الحاجة استناداً للتعيم رقم /٣/٢٤٨/٥٢٧١/ تاريخ ٢٠١١/٥/٢٠ .
- رفع بركات مع المقترحات المناسبة في حال التوصل إلى بيانات جديدة خلال التطبيقات بموجب الإعلام عنها .
- إرسال نسخة عن الرقعة إلى الأفرع /٢/٢٩١ - ٤/٢٩١ - ٢٧١ - ٢٤٤ - ٢٣٥ - ٢٤٨ للإطلاع
بموجبي الإطلاع والقرار

المستد الرئيسي
رئيس الفرع ٢٩١

- رأي رئيس الفرع ٢٩١ : أمر بامتناعه ومخاطبة الفرع ٥٧١ عن ما وضعه سبيل
/٧/ صاتم بخاوس لدم
٩/٤

- رأي السيد اللواء نائب رئيس شعبة المقاربات :

- قرار السيد اللواء رئيس شعبة المقاربات :

SYR.E0001.015.015_ET

8. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 24 August 2011, distributed 25 August 2011

**Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command**

Number: 449

Date: 25/8/2011

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission

Highly Confidential

Kept with the person in charge in person

Type text here

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting, on Wednesday 24/8/2011, at 21:30, chaired by Comrade Assistant Regional Secretary. The overall security situation was examined as well as the items on the agenda, the chances of the situation developing and the appropriate methods to handle the situation. The meeting proceeded as follows:

- The decisions made in the previous meeting and those completed so far were reviewed, and the importance of fulfilling the remaining decisions was underlined.
- The situation in the governorate of Homs was assessed as well as the procedures and measures implemented to reinforce the perimeter around the city to control entry and exit, the patrols that were created to work inside the city and the committee that was formed to liaise with city districts, in addition to the need to postpone the launch of communication and dialogue until after armed individuals are subdued and calm returns to the city and governorate.
- The situation was assessed in the governorate of Idleb (Jabal al-Zawyeh district), in rural Hama governorate (Madiq Castle district) and neighboring villages, in addition to the effectiveness of the joint operation that must be implemented in coordination between security committees in both governorates to arrest wanted persons and the importance of accurately studying the district where wanted persons hide out.
- The plan that will be implemented in the two adjacent districts in the governorates of Idleb and Hama was outlined, and importance was given to verifying the plan, organizing cooperation to ensure success and the need to conclude it by the evening of Sunday 28/8/2011.
- The fundamental principle of reducing losses was stressed, in addition to catching targets through successful quality operations and handling situations in a timely manner according to the availability of information.
- The need to instruct security agencies to rely on their resources and carry out the missions of catching targets even without the assistance of army units was stressed.
- The situation in Deir ez-Zor governorate was examined in addition to the importance of following up on implemented missions and concluding them by the evening of Sunday 28/8/2011.
- The positive impact of the arrest of former Homs governor by Homs governorate citizens was examined in addition to preparing the files relating to him and presenting him to the fair justice system.
- The possibility of issuing a general pardon by Eid El Fitr was examined for arrested persons who have not committed crimes.

At the end of the meeting, the following decisions were made:

1. Continuing the security operation currently implemented in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor and concluding it by the evening of Sunday 28/8/2011.
2. Conducting the necessary coordination between Comrade Deputy General Commander – Minister of Defense and Comrade Minister of Interior, to implement the special plan for the joint operation that will be carried out in the adjacent districts of the governorates of Idleb and Hama.
3. Pursuing the plan developed to control the situation in the city of Homs and forming a Joint Investigation Committee in the city. The Committee should deliver the results of its investigations immediately to security agencies for timely utilization.
4. Assigning Comrade Head of the Political Security Department to the governorate of Homs to lead the work of security branches on the ground and to contribute to the successful implementation of the plan developed to control the situation in the governorate of Homs.
5. Assigning Comrade Head of the State Security Directorate to the Idleb governorate to command security branches on the ground.
6. Assigning Comrade Minister of Interior to supervise the completion of security procedures in the governorate of Hama.
7. Announcing the positive results of investigations conducted with arrested persons via mass media to polarize local and international public opinion.

Please be informed

Assistant Regional Secretary

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي

القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية

سري للغاية

الرقم: 449

يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

التاريخ: 2011/8/25

محضر اجتماع

- اجتمعت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات يوم الأربعاء 2011/8/24 الساعة 21,30 برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري المساعد، وقامت بدراسة الموقف الأمني بشكل عام والمواضيع المدرجة في جدول الأعمال، واحتمالات تطور الموقف وأساليب العمل المناسبة لمعالجتها، ودارت وقائع الاجتماع على النحو التالي:
- تم استعراض القرارات المتخذة في الاجتماع السابق وما نفذ منها والتأكيد على متابعة تنفيذ القرارات التي لم تُنفذ.
 - تقييم الموقف في محافظة حمص والإجراءات والتدابير التي نفذت لتعزيز الطوق حول المدينة للسيطرة على حركة الدخول والخروج، والدوريات التي تم تشكيلها للعمل داخل المدينة، واللجنة التي شكلت للتواصل مع الأحياء وضرورة تأجيل بدء اتصالاتها وحواراتها بعد استكمال السيطرة على المسلحين وعودة التهدة إلى المدينة والمحافظة.
 - تقييم الموقف في محافظة ادلب (منطقة جبل الزاوية)، وفي ريف محافظة حماة (منطقة قلعة المضيق) والقرى المجاورة لها، وفعالية العملية المشتركة التي لا بد من تنفيذها بالتنسيق بين اللجان الأمنية في المحافظتين للقبض على المطلوبين، ودراسة المنطقة التي يأوي إليها المطلوبون بدقة.
 - الاطلاع بالخطوط العريضة على الخطة التي ستنفذ في المنطقتين المتجاورتين في محافظتي ادلب وحماة، وأهمية تنقيحها، وتنظيم التعاون لتأمين نجاحها، وضرورة إنهاؤها حتى مساء يوم الأحد 2011/8/28.
 - التأكيد على المبدأ الأساسي المتضمن تخفيف الخسائر، والقبض على الأهداف بعمليات نوعية ناجحة ومعالجة المواقف والمواضيع أنياً في وقتها حسب توفر المعلومات.
 - ضرورة توجيه الأجهزة الأمنية للاعتماد على إمكانياتها وتنفيذها مهام القبض على الأهداف حتى بدون مساعدة وحدات الجيش.
 - دراسة الموقف في محافظة دير الزور وأهمية متابعة المهام المنفذة وإنهائها حتى مساء يوم الأحد 2011/8/28.
 - دراسة الأثر الإيجابي الذي تحدثه عملية توقيف محافظ حمص السابق لدى مواطني محافظة حمص، وتحضير الملفات الخاصة به وتقديمه للقضاء العادل.
 - دراسة إمكانية إصدار عفو عام عن الموقوفين غير المرتكبين جرائم قبل عيد الفطر السعيد.

SYR.E0001.015.015

في نهاية الاجتماع تقرر مايلي:

1- متابعة العملية الأمنية المنفذة حالياً في محافظة دير الزور وإنهائها حتى مساء يوم الأحد 2011/8/28

2- إجراء التنسيق اللازم بين الرفيق العماد نائب القائد العام- وزير الدفاع والرفيق وزير الداخلية، لتنفيذ

الخطة الخاصة بالعملية المشتركة التي ستنفذ في المنطقتين المتجاورتين لمحافظة ادلب وحماة.

3- متابعة تنفيذ الخطة الموضوعية للسيطرة على الموقف في مدينة حمص، وتشكيل لجنة تحقيق مشتركة

في المدينة، تسلم نتائج تحقيقها بشكل فوري للأجهزة الأمنية للاستفادة منها أنياً.

4- تكليف الرفيق رئيس شعبة الأمن السياسي بالذهاب إلى محافظة حمص لتولي قيادة عمل الفروع الأمنية

فيها على الأرض، والمساهمة في نجاح تنفيذ الخطة الموضوعية للسيطرة على الموقف في محافظة

حمص.

5- تكليف الرفيق مدير إدارة أمن الدولة بالذهاب إلى محافظة ادلب ليتولى قيادة الفروع الأمنية فيها

على الأرض.

6- تكليف الرفيق وزير الداخلية بالإشراف على استكمال الإجراءات الأمنية في محافظة حماة.

7- إعلان نتائج التحقيقات الإيجابية المنفذة مع الموقوفين بوسائل الإعلام، لاستقطاب الرأي العام المحلي

والدولي.

يرجى التفضل بالاطلاع

الأمين القطري المساعد

SYR.E0001.015.017_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region-Regional Command
Number: 451
Date: 4/9/2011

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Message

Highly Confidential
To be kept with the officer in charge in person

9. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 03 September, distributed 04 September 2011

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting on Saturday 3/9/2011 at 14:15, headed by Comrade Assistant Regional Secretary. During the meeting, the security situation in general, the items of the agenda, the likelihood of situation further developing, and the measures to be taken to address the situation, were discussed. Below are the proceedings of the meeting:

- The meeting reviewed the decisions taken during the last meeting and those that were implemented. The meeting stressed the implementation of the decisions that have not been implemented yet.
- The meeting examined the security situation in the country in general and the incidents that took place during the Fitr holiday in particular in hotspots such as Rural Damascus, the governorate of Homs, the rural area of the governorate of Hama, the governorate of Idleb, and the governorate of Deir ez-Zor.
- The meeting examined new methods used by terrorists and armed individuals, such as kidnapping hostages, stealing and hijacking cars, attacking property, setting ablaze shops or headquarters, even imposing levies on some citizens, the steady increase in the number of armed individuals and the best ways to deal with them.
- The meeting stressed the importance of geographically studying and accurately specifying the areas where operations will take place, of activating the role of agents and informers from among Party members and others, of gathering as much information as possible to ensure the implementation of rapid, surprise and successful raids and storming.
- The meetings examined the checkpoints that are still installed on the (Damascus-Aleppo) international highway and the negative effect they have on the flow of traffic circulation on that road.
- The meetings examined the preparations for the process of dialogue that will be launched on 5/9/2011 and preparing a favorable climate for its launching and success.
- The meeting examined compensations to affected citizens who sustained damage as a result of the unfortunate incidents that took place in Syria.

SYR.E0001.015.018_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

At the conclusion of the meeting, the following was decided:

- 1- Assign Comrade Head of the Intelligence Department to supervise security personnel's implementation of missions assigned to them in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor. Comrade Head of the Political Security Department is to follow up on the mission assigned to him in the governorate of Homs.
- 2- Assign the Comrade Director of the General Intelligence Directorate to visit the governorate of Idleb starting on 4/9/2011 to supervise security personnel's implementation of the missions in the governorate of Idleb and give special attention to the district of Jabal al-Zawiya.
- 3- Security agency personnel shall rely on their own capacities to implement security operations. When there is no capacity to carry out a mission, they shall be reinforced by the appropriate number of militaries.
- 4- Assign the Imad Minister of Defense and Comrade Major General Minister of Interior to check the raid and inspection plan set up by the commanders in the district of Jabal al-Zawiya in the governorate of Idleb, and the district of Al-Madiq Castle in the governorate of Hama; to visit the district as of 6/9/2011 and meet with the relevant commanders; and to supervise the implementation as of 7/9/2011. Assign Comrade Minister of Interior to the mission of supervision from the district of Hama.
- 5- Coordinate with the Minister of Religious Endowments to re-open Al-Rifai Mosque in Kafr Sousa.
- 6- Remove the security checkpoint located on the (Damascus-Aleppo) international highway, situated north of the city of Damascus.
- 7- Assign Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau to set up a plan in coordination with the heads of competent security agencies. Assign the Secretary of the Rural Damascus Governorate Al-Ghouta, investigate the fact that a large number of individuals were killed and injured during the incidents of Friday 2/9/2011, and identify the responsible parties.
- 8- The Governor of Deir ez-Zor shall take immediate legal measures against any employee or worker who does not show up to work within 48 hours.
- 9- Remind Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau to prepare lists of the names of demonstrators detained by the security agencies and the Ministry of the Interior. It was requested to examine having them pardoned.
- 10- Ratify the decision to compensate the citizens who were affected as a result of the incidents that occurred in Syria based on the reports drawn for killings, seizure of houses, burning of shops and residences and other incidents.

Be informed.

Assistant Regional Secretary

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي

القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية

سري للغاية

الرقم: 451

يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

التاريخ: 2011/9/4

محضر اجتماع

- اجتمعت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات يوم السبت 2011/9/3 الساعة 14,15 برئاسة الرفيق الأمين القطري المساعد، وقامت بدراسة الموقف الأمني بشكل عام والمواضيع المدرجة في جدول الأعمال، واحتمالات تطور الموقف والإجراءات الواجب اتخاذها لمواجهة، ودارت وقائع الاجتماع على النحو التالي :
- تم استعراض القرارات المتخذة في الاجتماع السابق وما نفذ منها، والتأكيد على تنفيذ القرارات التي لم تنفذ بعد.
 - تمت دراسة الموقف الأمني في القطر بشكل عام والحوادث التي وقعت خلال عطلة عيد الفطر بشكل خاص في المناطق الساخنة، كريف دمشق ومحافظة حمص وريف محافظة حماة ومحافظة ادلب ومحافظة دير الزور.
 - دراسة الأساليب الجديدة التي يتبعها الإرهابيون والمسلحون من خطف للرهائن، وسرقة وسلب السيارات، والاعتداء على الممتلكات، وحرق المحال التجارية أو المقرات، وحتى فرض الإتاوات على بعض المواطنين، وتزايد أعداد المسلحين باضطراد، وأنسب الأساليب للتعامل معها.
 - تنمين أهمية دراسة المناطق التي سيتم العمل فيها جغرافياً وتحديد دقة، وتفعيل عمل المندوبين والمخبرين من عناصر الحزب وغيرهم، وتجميع أكبر كم من المعلومات التي تؤمن تنفيذ مظاهرات، وإغارات سريعة ومفاجئة وناجحة.
 - دراسة الحواجز التي لازالت مقامة على الطريق الدولية (دمشق- حلب)، والأثر السلبي الذي تحدثه في انسياب حركة السير على تلك الطريق.
 - دراسة الإعداد لعملية الحوار التي ستنتقل بدءاً من 2011/9/5، وتهيئة المناخ الملائم لبدنه ونجاحه.
 - دراسة التعويض على المواطنين المتضررين الذين تأذوا نتيجة الحوادث المؤسفة التي وقعت في القطر.

في نهاية الاجتماع تقرر مايلي:

- 1- تكليف الرفيق رئيس شعبة المخبرات بالإشراف على تنفيذ العناصر الأمنية للمهام المكلفين بها في محافظة دير الزور، ومتابعة الرفيق رئيس شعبة الأمن السياسي المهمة المكلف بتنفيذها في محافظة حمص.
- 2- تكليف الرفيق مدير إدارة المخبرات العامة بالذهاب إلى محافظة ادلب بدءاً من 2011/9/4 للإشراف على تنفيذ العناصر الأمنية للمهام في محافظة ادلب، وإعطاء أهمية خاصة لمنطقة جبل الزاوية.
- 3- اعتماد عناصر الأجهزة الأمنية على إمكانياتهم الذاتية في تنفيذ العمليات الأمنية، وفي حال عدم توفر الإمكانيات لإنجاز إحدى المهام يتم دعمهم بالقوام المناسب من العسكريين.
- 4- تكليف الرفيق العماد وزير الدفاع والرفيق اللواء وزير الداخلية بتنسيق خطة المداومة والتفتيش الموضوعية من قبل القادة في منطقة جبل الزاوية في محافظة ادلب، ومنطقة قلعة المضيق في محافظة حماة، وبالذهاب إلى المنطقة بدءاً من 2011/9/6 والاجتماع مع القادة المعنيين، والإشراف على التنفيذ بدءاً من 2011/9/7، وتكليف الرفيق وزير الداخلية بمهمة الإشراف من منطقة حماة.
- 5- التنسيق مع وزير الأوقاف لإعادة فتح جامع الرفاعي في كفر سوسة.
- 6- إزالة الحاجز الأمني الموجود على الطريق الدولية (دمشق- حلب) والكائن شمال مدينة دمشق.
- 7- تكليف الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي بوضع خطة بالتعاون مع رؤساء الأجهزة الأمنية المختصة، وأمين فرع محافظة ريف دمشق لمعالجة الموقف المتردي في الغوطة الشرقية، والتحقق في وقوع عدد كبير من القتلى والمصابين في أحداث يوم الجمعة 2011/9/2 وتحميد المسؤولية.
- 8- على محافظ دير الزور اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية الفورية بحق أي موظف أو عامل لا يلتحق بعمله خلال 48 ساعة.
- 9- التأكيد على الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي إعداد لوائح بأسماء المتظاهرين الموقوفين لدى الأجهزة الأمنية ووزارة الداخلية والمطلوب دراسة العفو عنهم.
- 10- إقرار مبدأ التعويض على المواطنين المتضررين نتيجة الحوادث التي وقعت في القطر وفق الضبوط المنظمة بحوادث القتل أو مصادرة البيوت أو حرق المتاجر وأماكن الإقامة وغيرها.

يرجى التفضل بالاطلاع

الأمين القطري المساعد

SYR.E0001.015.022_ET

10. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 22 October 2011, distributed 23 October 2011

**Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region- Regional Command**

No: 475

Date: 23/10/2011

One Arab Nation With an Eternal Mission

Highly Confidential

**To be kept with the person in charge
personally**

Minutes of Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting on Saturday 22/10/2011 at 19,00, headed by Comrade Imad Hassan Turkomani, member of the regional command. During the meeting, the security situation in Homs, Hama, Idleb, and Dar'a in particular, the likelihood of it further developing, and the measures to be taken, were discussed. The following are the details of the meeting:

- Comrade Imad Turkomani provided instructions on the work plan for the next phase, whereby the issues and problems would be meticulously and objectively studied, every issue would be soundly analyzed, solution-oriented conclusions would be reached, decisions would be taken, recommendations would be raised to Mr. President for ratification and measures for their accurate implementation would be taken.

- The new work mechanism including monitoring and assistance was presented. Implementation would be followed up and intervention would be required when dysfunctions are noted. Problems shall not be left unsolved.

- The importance of binding security agencies to fully and seriously implement the tasks was noted.

- The importance of collective thinking to set up plans and find solutions to all discussed issues was noted, while always taking into considerations future partisan, security, and military goals, as well as the other aspects of every issue in such a way that matches political, economic, and security developments. The needed amendments could be made according to developments to achieve results and ensure a successful achievement of plans and measures.

- The tangible positive effect of fieldwork was studied. The importance of taking advantage of the achieved successes to preserve the sovereignty of the state was noted. The need of the Cell to move to some hot zones for a day or two to study the field situation and radically solve the problem was also discussed.

- The importance of studying the situation, setting up a mechanism for solution, listening to the people who can fulfill effective tasks, specifying gaps and the reasons behind impediments, coming up with successful solutions after reaching a unified vision for solution, was noted.

- The importance of seeking to create a welcoming environment for implementing elements and the use of different methods to win the public opinion and society over and render residents cooperative was discussed.

- Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau had a presentation and presented a report on how to tackle the situation in Homs and the tangible issues on all levels. He presented the measures that should be implemented by comrades

as well as by security agencies in order to solve the crisis. He also spoke of downsides ensuing from the implementation of different tasks, which should be avoided.

- The importance of the strategic rapprochement with Federal Russia and the economic, political, security, and military gains that can be achieved were studied.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the following was decided:

- 1- Conduct a comprehensive adjustment and meticulous analysis of the tasks that were previously implemented; come up with effective solutions to existent problems; and clearly set the goals to be reached.
- 2- Set up new work mechanisms; impose control on all security agencies, military units, partisan comrades, and organizations.
- 3- The Crisis Management Cell is to carry out field visits to supervise the implementation of tasks in the governorates; crosscheck the received reports to have a clear picture of the situation; and amend the plans and implemented measures.
- 4- Circulars, personal and written orders are not to be considered sufficient. Tasks should be clearly specified and implementing elements should be asked to set forth a work mechanism, periodically file follow-up reports, monitor the implementation, and set up further mechanisms to reach the desired goals.
- 5- Channel focus to limiting armed acts and fending off terrorist and vandalism acts.
- 6- Bind the elements of security agencies to wear full field uniform when conducting patrols, raids, and arrests, as well as when guarding checkpoints, so that impersonation acts carried out by militants and terrorists are limited.
- 7- Assign Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau to set and draft clear orders to be given to security agencies, specifying the issues and the ways to deal with them, and follow up the implementation of orders on a daily basis.
- 8- Commit to institutionalism and maintain coordination between the Central Cell and the different executive agencies. The cell will supervise the agencies' inter-coordination and their commitment to a clear work mechanism.
- 9- Coordinate with the media outlets; specify the media homeland-oriented approach and the image to be promoted, relying on the available media experiences.
- 10- Dedicate time and real effort to end unemployment in the different fields.
- 11- Intensify the meeting of the Central Crisis Management Cell; set up a strategy to implement the tasks, solve the crisis, and end its repercussions.

Kindly be informed

Head of the Central Crisis Management Cell

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
 أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة
 القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية
 الرقم: 475
 التاريخ: 2011/10/23
 سري للغاية
 يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

محضر اجتماع

اجتمعت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات يوم السبت 2011/10/22 الساعة 19,00 برئاسة الرفيق العماد حسن تركماني عضو القيادة القطرية. وقامت بدراسة الموقف الأمني بشكل عام وفي محافظات حمص وحماة وإدلب ودرعا بشكل خاص ، واحتمالات تطوره والإجراءات الواجب اتخاذها لمواجهتها. ودارت وقائع الاجتماع على النحو التالي:

- الاستماع لتوجيهات الرفيق العماد رئيس الاجتماع حول العمل في المرحلة القادمة والعمل على دراسة المواضيع والمشاكل المواجهة بدقة وموضوعية، وتحليل كل مسألة بشكل صحيح والخروج باستنتاجات تؤدي إلى حلول، واتخاذ قرارات ورفع توصيات للسيد الرئيس لإقرارها واتخاذ الإجراءات لتنفيذها بدقة.
- استعراض آلية العمل الجديدة المتضمنة المراقبة وتقديم المساعدة، ومتابعة آليات التنفيذ والتدخل عند الشعور بوجود خلل ما، وعدم ترك أي مشكلة معلقة.
- استعراض أهمية إلزام الأجهزة الأمنية بتنفيذ المهام بشكل كامل وبالجدية المطلوبة.
- استعراض أهمية التفكير المشترك للوصول إلى خطط و حلول لكافة القضايا المطروحة مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار بشكل دائم الروى والأهداف المستقبلية من كافة الجوانب، الحزبية والأمنية والعسكرية والجوانب الأخرى لكل مسألة أو قضية بشكل يتوافق ويتلاءم مع التطورات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية، مع إمكانية إجراء التعديلات المناسبة حسب المستجدات للوصول إلى نتائج تؤدي لإنجاز ناجح للخطط والإجراءات.
- دراسة الأثر الإيجابي للعمل الميداني على الأرض، ومعالجة الوقائع الماثلة واستثمار النجاحات المحققة لتأمين هبة الدولة وانتقال الخلية إلى بعض المحافظات الساخنة لمدة 1-2 يوم للتدقيق الميداني ومعالجة الموقف الماثل بشكل جذري.
- دراسة أهمية دراسة الموقف وتكوين تصور وآلية لكيفية معالجته على الأرض، والاستماع لكل الناس الذين يمكن أن يؤدوا عملاً مفيداً، وتحديد الثغرات ومن ثم سبب الثغرة، واستنباط الحلول الناجحة بعد الوصول لرؤى موحدة للمعالجة.
- دراسة أهمية السعي لخلق بيئة حاضنة تنشط فيها العناصر المنفذة، واستخدام أساليب متنوعة لاستمالة الرأي العام والمجتمع لصف الدولة وكسب تعاون السكان.
- الاستماع لعرض وتقرير الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي حول معالجة الموقف في محافظة حمص والسليبيات الملموسة في كافة المجالات والإجراءات المطلوب تنفيذها في المحافظة من قبل الرفاق

والأجهزة الأمنية للمساهمة في معالجة الأزمة، والسلبيات الواجب تلافيها والناجمة عن تنفيذ مختلف الأعمال.

- دراسة أهمية التوجه الاستراتيجي نحو روسيا الاتحادية، والمزايا التي يمكن تحقيقها في مختلف المجالات الاقتصادية والسياسية والأمنية والعسكرية.

في نهاية الاجتماع تقرر مايلي:

- 1- إجراء تقييم شامل للأعمال والمهام التي نفذت سابقاً وتحليلها بعمق، واستنباط الحلول الناجمة للمشاكل المواجهة وتحديد الأهداف التي يجب بلوغها بشكل واضح.
- 2- وضع آليات جديدة للعمل، وضبط وتبنيه على مستوى كافة الأجهزة الأمنية والوحدات العسكرية والرفاق الحزبيين والمنظمات.
- 3- اعتماد الزيارات الميدانية لخلية إدارة الأزمات للإشراف على تنفيذ المهام في المحافظات، وتطبيق التقارير الواردة للوصول إلى تصور صحيح للموقف، وتصحيح الخطط والإجراءات المنفذة.
- 4- عدم الاكتفاء بالتعاميم والأوامر الشخصية أو الخطية، ويتم تحديد ما هو مطلوب تنفيذه، ومطالبة المنفذين بتحديد آلية العمل، ورفع تقارير دورية للمتابعة، ومراقبة التنفيذ ووضع آليات إضافية للوصول إلى الأهداف المنشودة.
- 5- التركيز على معالجة الأعمال المسلحة والتصدي لأعمال الإرهابيين والمخربين.
- 6- إلزام كافة عناصر الأجهزة الأمنية بارتداء لباس الميدان الكامل عند تنفيذهم للدوريات والمهام والقبض على المطلوبين، وعند العمل على الحواجز المختلفة لوضع حد لعمليات انتحال الصفة من قبل المسلحين والإرهابيين.
- 7- تكليف الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي بإعداد وصياغة الأوامر الواضحة التي تسند للأجهزة الأمنية، مع تحديد السلبيات وأساليب معالجتها ومتابعة تنفيذ الأوامر الصادرة يومياً.
- 8- التزام العمل المؤسسي وإجراء التنسيق اللازم والتعاون بين الخلية المركزية ومختلف الأجهزة التنفيذية، وإشراف الخلية على تعاون الأجهزة فيما بينها والتزامهم بآلية عمل واضحة.
- 9- التنسيق مع وسائل الإعلام المختلفة، وتحديد آلية المقاربة والتوجه للمواطن، وتحديد المنظور الواجب الوصول إليه والاعتماد على الخبرات الإعلامية المتوفرة.
- 10- استثمار الزمن والوقت والعمل بمنتهى الجدية والسرعة، والقضاء على العطالة في كافة الأعمال.
- 11- تكثيف وتيرة اجتماعات الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات، وتحديد الإستراتيجية المناسبة لتنفيذ المهام ومعالجة الأزمة وإزالة أثارها.

يرجى التفضل بالاطلاع

رئيس الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات

SYR.E0001.015.028_ET

11. CCMC Meeting Minutes, 26 October 2011, distributed on 27 October 2011

**Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command**

Number: 479

Date: 27/10/2011

**One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission
Highly Confidential**

**To be kept with the person in charge
personally**

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell held a meeting, on Wednesday 26/10/2011, at 19:00, chaired by Comrade Imad Hasan Turkomani, member of the Regional Command, to study the security situation in general and in the governorates of: Dar'a, Homs, Hama and Idleb in particular, in addition to the chances of the situation developing and the measures that should be taken to address developments. The meeting proceeded as follows:

- The minutes of the two Cell meetings held on 22-24/10/2011 were read, the decisions that have been implemented and those underway were identified, and the need to complete the implementation of all decisions was underlined.
- The phenomenon of closing down retail shops was reviewed for the governorates of: Dar'a – Homs – Hama – Idleb – Rural Damascus, as well as the role of armed individuals and terrorists who instigated the closure of shops, the purpose of the closure and the expectation that this phenomenon would be repeated in the future. The best methods and legal procedures to address the phenomenon were discussed.
- The role and importance of implementing decisions made by security committees were examined, and a commander was nominated to be in charge of supervising the implementation of these decisions by security agencies and military units according to the content of each decision.
- The positive impact of the presence of some or all of the Central Cell members in some governorates to observe the security situation was studied, as well as the provision of the necessary assistance to resolve errors made and to alleviate the causes of the crisis plaguing the governorates. Competent parties were each reminded of their responsibility and their propositions were heard. The need was emphasized to implement decisions fully and reach the specified objectives.
- The positive impact of resolving errors made as soon as possible was examined, in addition to the importance of ending the state of non-response, implementing the orders only of direct superiors, vesting the commander in charge with the necessary authorities to hold accountable any wrongdoer from any agency and placing the interest of the country above all else.
- The additional expenses incurred by security agencies (disbursement of additional compensation – catering costs – security, aid and other expenses) were reviewed and the need to dedicate and deliver supplementary allocations was stressed.

- The spread of the phenomenon of blocking international and interior governorate roads was examined, and the importance of keeping them constantly open was stressed as well as the imperative of positive response to the ambushes that may be set up on the roads.
- The phenomenon of the increased capture and hijacking of government cars and vehicles, and the possible reasons behind it, were analyzed considering the possibility of using them in explosions to kill a large number of victims and scare civilians. The importance of taking measures to end the phenomenon was stressed.
- The need to intensify intelligence, security and media action was underlined to combat the hijacking of government cars, abduction of civilians, theft of cargo, demand of ransoms and other blackmailing operations, in addition to the imperative of pursuing and arresting armed individuals and terrorists, and the imperative of encouraging civilians to cooperate with competent authorities to catch perpetrators.
- Raising public awareness (each civilian is a watchman) was examined as well as the deepening of patriotism and cooperation with the state.
- The increased attacks of armed individuals against security roadblocks were studied, in addition to their use of various weapons and ammunition and the repeated attempts to hinder the study.
- The events that are expected to occur next Friday, 28/10/2011, were reviewed alongside the appropriate measures to reduce their repercussions.

At the end of the meeting, the following decisions were made:

1. Instructing governors to use their legal powers and take the necessary measures to reopen shops that were closed (sealing with red wax – threatening to withdraw permit – handing over the closed shop to another person – punishment for undermining public interests – asking the public prosecutor for the authority to reopen the shops...etc).
2. Appointing Comrade Major General Head of the Political Security Department to command security agencies and armed forces units present in the governorate of Homs, and vesting him with full powers to take the necessary legal measures against any offender or anyone who acts with laxity.
3. Appointing Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau to study the needed additional needs of each security authority (army – police – security agencies) especially with regards to food, in order to file the request to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
4. Intensifying intelligence and security work to end the phenomenon of hijacking government cars, seizing goods and money, abducting people and demanding ransom.
5. Submitting lists on the names and descriptions of wanted persons and stolen vehicles to be broadcast through various mass media and allocating the appropriate rewards for each civilian who helps catch them. Disseminating the results of investigations on the ground to help combat the phenomenon. Creating documentaries that show the existence of defectors from the armed forces.

SYR.E0001.015.030_ET

6. Raising awareness about proper conduct during crises, responding to the initiatives of armed individuals and terrorists and the right to legitimate self defense.
7. Assigning security patrols and police members to suppress any attempt to block the road and disrupt traffic without resorting to shooting.
8. Sending out patrols and setting up ambushes at irregular intervals to catch perpetrators red handed in the attempt to steal cars and their cargo.
9. Taking the appropriate decisions to prevent the escalation and spread of civil disobedience. Comrades Branch Secretaries, branch commanders, governors and governorate councils should communicate with civilians and the Ministry of Interior should ensure the appropriate security.

Please be informed

Head of the Central Crisis Management Cell

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
القطر العربي السوري - القيادة القطرية
الرقم: 479
التاريخ: 2011/10/27

أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة
سري للغاية
يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

محضر اجتماع

- اجتمعت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات يوم الأربعاء 2011/10/26 الساعة 19,00 برئاسة الرفيق العماد حسن توركماني عضو القيادة القطرية، وقامت بدراسة الموقف الأمني بشكل عام وفي محافظات: درعا وحمص وحماة وادلب بشكل خاص، واحتمالات تطوره والإجراءات الواجب اتخاذها لمواجهتها، ودارت وقائع الاجتماع على النحو التالي:
- تلاوة محضري اجتماع الخلية يومي 22- 2011/10/24، وتحديد القرارات التي تم تنفيذها، والقرارات التي شرع في تنفيذها، والتأكيد على استكمال تنفيذ كافة القرارات المتخذة.
 - استعراض انتشار ظاهرة إغلاق المحلات التجارية في محافظات: درعا- حمص- حماة- ادلب- ريف دمشق، ودور المسلحين والإرهابيين الذين حرصوا على إغلاق المحلات، والغاية منها، وتوقع تكرار تلك الظاهرة مستقبلاً، كما تمت مناقشة الأساليب الناجعة لمواجهتها، والأساليب والطرق القانونية.
 - دراسة دور وأهمية تنفيذ القرارات المتخذة في اللجان الأمنية، وتحديد قائد مسؤول بتولي الإشراف على تلك القرارات من قبل الأجهزة الأمنية والوحدات العسكرية وفقاً لمضمون كل قرار.
 - دراسة الأثر الإيجابي لتواجد أعضاء الخلية المركزية جميعاً أو البعض منهم في بعض المحافظات للاطلاع على واقع الموقف الأمني فيها، وتقديم المساعدة اللازمة في معالجة الأخطاء المرتكبة، وفي إخماد أسباب الأزمة التي تعانيها، ووضع الجهات المعنية كل أمام مسؤوليتها والاستماع لمقترحاتهم، وإيصال القرارات المتخذة إلى النهايات والأهداف المحددة.
 - دراسة الأثر الإيجابي لمعالجة الأخطاء المرتكبة بالسرعة الممكنة، وأهمية الخروج من حالة عدم الرد، وتنفيذ إلا أمر الرئيس المباشر، وتزويد القائد المسؤول بالصلاحيات اللازمة لمحاسبة أي مخطئ من أي جهاز، ووضع مصلحة الوطن فوق كل اعتبار.
 - استعراض التكاليف المادية الإضافية التي وقعت على كاهل الأجهزة الأمنية (صرف تعويضات إضافية- نفقات الطعام- نفقات أمنية ومساعدات وغيرها)، وضرورة رصد الاعتمادات المالية الإضافية وتزويدهم بها.

- دراسة توسع ظاهرة قطع الطرقات سواء الدولية أو داخل المحافظات، وأهمية المحافظة عليها مفتوحة بشكل دائم، وتعميق أهمية الرد الإيجابي على الكائن المحتمل نصيبها على الطرقات.
- تحليل ظاهرة ازدياد ومصادرة وسلب السيارات والعربات الحكومية، والأسباب المحتمل أن تكون كاملة خلفها، والأخذ بعين الاعتبار استغلالها واستخدامها في عمليات تلغيم وتفجير بغية إيقاع عدد كبير من الضحايا، وليث الذعر بين المواطنين، وأهمية اتخاذ الإجراءات الكفيلة بوضع حد لها.
- دراسة أهمية تكثيف العمل الاستخباراتي والأمني والإعلامي لمكافحة سلب السيارات الحكومية وخطف المواطنين، وسلب الحمولات وطلب الفدية، وعمليات الابتزاز الأخرى، وأهمية ملاحقة المسلحين والإرهابيين والقاء القبض عليهم، والأساليب التي تشجع المواطنين للتعاون مع السلطات المعنية للقبض على الفاعلين.
- دراسة تعميق ثقافة (كل مواطن خفير)، وترسيخ حب الوطن والتعاون مع الدولة.
- دراسة ازدياد مهاجمة المسلحين للحواجز الأمنية، واستخدام أسلحة وذخائر متنوعة، والمحاولات المتكررة لتعطيل الدراسة.
- استعراض الأحداث المتوقع حصولها يوم الجمعة القادم 2011/10/28، والإجراءات المناسبة للحد من تداعياتها.

في نهاية الاجتماع تقرر مايلي:

- 1- تكليف المحافظين باستخدام صلاحياتهم القانونية، واتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لإعادة فتح المحلات التي أغلقت (ختم بالشمع الأحمر - التهديد بسحب الرخصة - تسليم المحل الغلق لشخص آخر - المعاقبة بسبب الإضرار بمصالح الناس - طلب الصلاحية من المحامي العام لفتح المحلات الخ) .
- 2- تكليف الرفيق اللواء رئيس شعبة الأمن السياسي بقيادة الأجهزة الأمنية ووحدات القوات المسلحة الموجودة في محافظة حمص، وتزويده بالصلاحيات الكاملة لاتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بحق كل مخطئ أو متهاون.
- 3- تكليف الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي بدراسة الاحتياجات الإضافية اللازمة لكل الجهات الأمنية (جيش - شرطة - أجهزة أمنية) فيما يتصل بالإطعام بشكل خاص ليتم طلبها من رئاسة مجلس الوزراء.
- 4- تكثيف العمل الاستخباراتي والأمني لوضع حد لظاهرة سلب السيارات الحكومية ومصادرة البضائع والأموال واختطاف الأشخاص وطلب الفدية.
- 5- رفع لوائح بأسماء وأوصاف المطلوبين والعربات المسلوقة لإذاعتها بوسائط الإعلام المختلفة مع رصد المكافآت المناسبة لكل مواطن يساعد في إلقاء القبض عليهم، وإذاعة نتائج التحقيق على الأرض للمساعدة في مكافحة الظاهرة، وإعداد الأفلام الوثائقية التي تغند وجود منشقين عن القوات المسلحة.

- 6- تعميق ثقافة حسن التصرف في المواقف المتأزمة والرد على مبادرات المسلحين والإرهابيين وحق الدفاع المشروع عن النفس.
- 7- تكليف الدوريات الأمنية وعناصر الشرطة بقمع أي محاولة لقطع الطرقات وتعطيل حركة السير عليها دون اللجوء إلى إطلاق النار.
- 8- تسيير دوريات ونصب كامائن بأوقات غير منتظمة للقبض بالجرم المشهود على محاولات سلب السيارات وحمولتها.
- 9- اتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة لمنع تفاقم وتفشى ظاهرة العصيان المدني وتواصل الرفاق أثناء الفروع وقيادات الفروع والمحافظين ومجالس المحافظة مع المواطنين وتأمين التغطية الأمنية المناسبة من قبل وزارة الداخلية.

يرجى التفضل بالاطلاع

رئيس الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات

12. CCMC Meeting Minutes of 21 November 2011, distributed on 22 November 2011

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Syrian Arab Region – Regional Command
Number: 492
Date: 22/11/2011

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Message
Highly Confidential
To be kept with the officer in charge in person

Minutes of the Meeting

The Central Crisis Management Cell held on Monday 21/11/2011 a meeting chaired by Comrade Imad Hasan Turkomani, member of the Regional Command. The meeting proceeded as follows:

- Review and emphasis on finalizing the implementation of decisions made in the previous session of 19/11/2011
- Informing participants of the inquiries made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates to the General Secretary of the Arab League on the formulation of the draft Arab League Protocol
- Examination of the National Security Bureau's letter number /1997/2/National Security of 21/11/2011 enclosed with a copy of the Military Public Prosecutor letter number /92697/ of 2/11/2011 on proposing that a formulation be found to prevent action against wanted persons whose status has been settled in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor between 15-22/9/2011
- Examination of the proposition of the security committee in the governorate of on reestablishing the military security roadblock installed earlier at the Tartous junction and the governorate's need for a control room
- Review of works completed in the governorate of Idleb, especially in the district of Jabal al-Zawiya; the accuracy of directives given to prevent armed and terrorist presence in the border zone with Turkey; and the importance of studying the need for forces and resources for achieving planned goals and supporting the units carrying out the mission at present
- Examining the security committee in the governorate of Dar'a minutes number /28/ of 15/11/2011, especially the last section thereof on supplying security agencies operating in the governorate with special anti-riot armored vehicles
- Informing participants of the contents of the Intelligence Department letter number /7330/ of 21/11/2011 reporting the request of the French Embassy in Damascus to its oil workers to leave the country immediately out of French fears of popular reprisals against them; confirmation of the director of Deir ez-Zor Petroleum Company of ongoing operation despite the absence of French workers; and importance of coordinating with competent authorities to ensure the security of embassies and foreign nationals in the country
- Informing participants of the progress of the investigation into a shooting incident (city district of Burza) on 9/11/2011 and the importance of promptly completing the file with the necessary documents, referring it to the competent judicial authorities and coordinating with Damascus Branch security to contact the families of victims
- Examining the request of the security committee in the governorate of Homs to conduct a large-scale operation in the city district of Baba Amr, affirming the implementation of successful small-scale quality operations after collecting full and accurate information about the targets and stressing the importance of making implementers understand the concept of small-scale quality operations and of properly preparing implementing groups.

SYR.E0001.015.047_ET

- Examining the importance of completing statistics on stolen and hijacked vehicles, especially (pickup trucks), the possibility of providing security agencies and patrol personnel with pickup trucks mounted with machineguns to ensure the needed effectiveness in pursuing and catching armed individuals and terrorists, and the importance of finding a creative way to curb the phenomenon of carjacking
- Reviewing the importance of verifying the status of mission implementing forces, especially in the governorate of Idleb, to control the remaining cities, towns and villages in the governorate and restore the State's standing, and making arrangements to provide a reserve force with the appropriate effective
- Examining the positive impact of continuing to monitor armed individuals and terrorists, knowing their operation methods and timing, and making appropriate arrangements to ensure the success of confrontation methods
- Reviewing the progress of coordination with the Ministry of Information to publish, track and successively show through various media outlets the photographs and names of wanted persons, and completing the lab and computer processing of photographs to be viable for circulation
- Reviewing the positive impact of the media appearances of parties involved in the National Progressive Front, provided that they each speak on behalf of their own party and in the context of contributing to the resolution of the crisis
- Examining the positive impact of appointing military commanders with recognized competence and experience to command operations, especially in hot governorates; vesting them with the power to command all superiors and heads of civil, military and security agencies in the district; and the importance of coming up with creative solutions to end the crisis

The following was decided at the conclusion of the meeting:

- 1- Adopting the second proposition of the Military Public Prosecutor on referring all cases concerning the settlement of status of wanted persons and those who made written statements on refraining from protest and on compliance with applicable laws and regulations in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor during 15-22/9/2011 to the Military Field Court by order of the General Commander of the Army and Armed Forces, and maintaining the cases in accordance with article /8/ of Legislative Decree No /9/ of 17/8/1968
- 2- Granting the request of the security committee in the governorate of Homs to approve reestablishing the military checkpoint at the Homs junction, using the operations room equipped by the Ministry of Interior in the governorate for commanding governorate operations, and coordinating with the governorate Police Command in this concern
- 3- Continuing the implementation of activities in the governorate of Idleb (Jabal al-Zawiya); occupying targets that secure the road to the border zone; ensuring the stationing of roadblocks and posts at the appropriate points to control the area; examining the situation of participating forces and the need for the necessary forces and resources to achieve all goals and ensure the stability of the governorate; and allocating a reserve force that would be at the ready when needed

SYR.E0001.015.048_ET

- 4- Supplying the governorate of Dar'a with the appropriate number of /BTR 152/ armored vehicles which the Ministry of Defense will deliver to the Ministry of Interior in early December 2011
- 5- The Ministry of Interior will be assigned to make the necessary arrangements to secure embassies and foreign nationals residing in the country, to make them aware of the same and announce it through appropriate media outlets after coordinating with the National Security Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates and the Ministry of Information
- 6- Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau will be assigned, in coordination with Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party's Damascus Branch, to contact the families of victims to complete the file of the Burza incident of 9/11/2011 before referring it to the competent judicial authorities
- 7- Relying on small-scale quality and successful operations implemented based on accurate earlier information specially developed to implement the mission
- 8- Comrade Head of the National Security Bureau will be assigned to follow up, in coordination with the Ministry of Information, on finalizing the publication of the names of wanted persons through various media outlets
- 9- The Head of the National Security Bureau and Comrade Minister of Interior will be assigned to examine supplying security agencies, especially those operating in hot governorates, with /pickup trucks/ and mounting them with appropriate weapons for use in confronting armed individuals and terrorists
- 10- Comrade Deputy General Commander – Minister of Defense will be assigned to propose the appropriate commanders for operations in hot governorates (Idleb – Hama – Homs...etc)
- 11- Presenting a recommendation to Comrade Assistant Regional Secretary to coordinate with the heads of National Progressive Front parties for media appearances in the form of seminars that help explain their point of view on resolving the crisis currently experienced by the country
- 12- Continuing the implementation of operations even with the presence of Arab League observers, in order to establish the State's rule over its territories and to secure the country and population.

Be informed and act accordingly.

Head of the Central Crisis Management Cell

حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي
 أمة عربية واحدة ذات رسالة خالدة
 القطر العربي السوري – القيادة القطرية
 الرقم: 492
 سري للغاية
 التاريخ: 2011/11/22
 يحفظ لدى المسؤول شخصياً

محضر اجتماع

- اجتمعت الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات يوم الاثنين الواقع في 2011/11/21 برئاسة الرفيق العماد حسن توركماني عضو القيادة القطرية، ودارت وقائع الاجتماع على النحو التالي:
- استعراض القرارات المتخذة في الاجتماع السابق الذي عقد بتاريخ 2011/11/19، والتأكيد على استكمال تنفيذها.
 - الإحاطة علماً بالاستفسارات التي طلبتها وزارة الخارجية والمغتربين من الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية حول صيغة مشروع بروتوكول الجامعة العربية.
 - دراسة كتاب مكتب الأمن القومي رقم /2/1997/أ.ق تاريخ 2011/11/21 المرفق بصورة عن كتاب النائب العام العسكري رقم /92697/تاريخ 2011/11/2 المتضمن اقتراح إيجاد صيغة لمنع ملاحقة المطلوبين الذين قاموا بتسوية أوضاعهم في محافظة دير الزور في الفترة الواقعة ما بين 15- 2011/9/22.
 - دراسة اقتراح اللجنة الأمنية في محافظة حمص المتضمن إعادة الحاجز الأمني العسكري الذي أقيم سابقاً على تحويلة طرطوس وحاجة المحافظة إلى غرفة عمليات.
 - استعراض سير الأعمال المنفذة في محافظة ادلب وخاصة منطقة جبل الزاوية، وصحة التوجيهات المعطاة لمنع المسلحين والإرهابيين من التواجد في منطقة الشريط الحدودي المحاذي للحدود التركية، وأهمية دراسة الحاجة من القوى والوسائل لتحقيق الأهداف المخططة ودعم الوحدات المنفذة للمهمة الآن.
 - دراسة محضر اللجنة الأمنية لمحافظة درعا رقم /28/ تاريخ 2011/11/15 وخاصة الفقرة الأخيرة منه المتضمنة تزويد الأجهزة الأمنية العاملة في المحافظة بعربات مصفحة خاصة بغض أعمال الشغب.
 - الإحاطة علماً بمضمون كتاب شعبة المخابرات رقم /7330/ تاريخ 2011/11/21 المتضمن الإعلام عن طلب السفارة الفرنسية بدمشق من رعاياها العاملين في مجال النفط مغادرة القطر فوراً، لخوف الفرنسيين من أي ردة فعل شعبية ضدهم، وتأكيد مدير شركة دير الزور للنفط باستمرار شركة دير الزور للنفط بالعمل رغم غياب العاملين الفرنسيين، وأهمية التنسيق مع الجهات المختصة للتأكيد على الحفاظ على أمن السفارات والرعايا الأجانب الموجودين في القطر.
 - الإحاطة علماً بسير استكمال التحقيقات في حادث إطلاق النار (حي برزة) الذي وقع بتاريخ 2011/11/9، وأهمية وسرعة استكمال الملف بالوثائق اللازمة وإحالته إلى الجهات القضائية المختصة والتنسيق مع أمن فرع دمشق للاتصال مع ذوي الضحايا.
 - دراسة طلب اللجنة الأمنية في محافظة حمص لتنفيذ عملية كبيرة في حي بابا عمرو، والتأكيد على تنفيذ عمليات نوعية صغيرة ناجحة بعد استكمال المعلومات الدقيقة عن الأهداف، وأهمية إيفاء المنفذين فكرة تنفيذ العمليات النوعية الصغيرة والإعداد الجيد للمجموعات المنفذة لها.

SYR.E0001.015.046

Type text here

- دراسة أهمية استكمال الإحصائية عن المركبات المسروقة والمسلوبة وخاصة (عربات البيك أب)، وإمكانية تزويد الأجهزة الأمنية وعناصر الدوريات بعربات بيك أب تركيب عليها رشاشات تساعد في تأمين الفاعلية اللازمة لملاحقة المسلحين والإرهابيين والقبض عليهم، وأهمية الوصول لطريقة مبتكرة للحد من ظاهرة سلب السيارات.
- استعراض أهمية تدقيق وضعية القوات المنفذة للمهام وخاصة في محافظة ادلب، للسيطرة على باقي المدن والبلدات والقرى في المحافظة وإعادة هبة الدولة إليها، واتخاذ الإجراءات لتوفير قوة احتياطية بقوام مناسب.
- دراسة الأثر الإيجابي لمتابعة مراقبة المسلحين والإرهابيين ومعرفة طرق تحركهم وتوقيتاتها، واتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة التي تؤمن نجاح أساليب مواجهتهم.
- استعراض المدى الذي وصلت إليه إجراءات التنسيق مع وزارة الإعلام للإعلان بوسائل الإعلام المختلفة عن صور وأسماء المطلوبين ومتابعتها وإظهارها تبعاً، واستكمال معالجة الصور مخبرياً وحاسوبياً لتكون صالحة للتعميم.
- استعراض الأثر الإيجابي للظهور الإعلامي للأحزاب المشاركة في الجبهة الوطنية التقدمية، على أن يتكلم كل منهم باسم حزيه وفي إطار المساهمة في إطار حل الأزمة.
- دراسة الأثر الإيجابي لتعيين قادة عسكريين مشهود لهم بالكفاءة والخبرة لقيادة العمليات وخاصة في المحافظات الساخنة، يزودون بصلاحيات لقيادة جميع المسؤولين ورؤساء الأجهزة المدنية والعسكرية والأمنية الموجودة في المنطقة، وأهمية التفكير بابتكار الحلول التي تساعد في إنهاء الأزمة.

في نهاية الاجتماع تقرر مايلي:

- 1- اعتماد المقترح الثاني للنايب العام العسكري المتضمن إحالة جميع القضايا المتعلقة بتسوية أوضاع المطلوبين والذين أخذت عليهم تصاريح خطية بعدم التظاهر، والالتزام بالقوانين والأنظمة النافذة في محافظة دير الزور في الفترة من 15- 2011/9/22 إلى محكمة الميدان العسكرية بقرار من القائد العام للجيش والقوات المسلحة مع حفظها استناداً لأحكام المادة /8/ من المرسوم التشريعي رقم /9/ تاريخ 17/8/1968.
- 2- الموافقة على طلب اللجنة الأمنية لمحافظة حمص المتضمن الموافقة على إعادة الحاجز العسكري على تحويله حمص، واستخدام غرفة العمليات التي تقوم بتجهيزها وزارة الداخلية في المحافظة لقيادة العمليات في المحافظة، والتنسيق مع قيادة شرطة المحافظة حول ذلك.
- 3- متابعة تنفيذ الأعمال في محافظة ادلب (جبل الزاوية)، واحتلال الأهداف التي تؤمن الطرق المؤدية إلى الشريط الحدودي وتأمين تمرکز الحواجز والمخافر في النقاط المناسبة للسيطرة على المنطقة، ودراسة وضعية القوات المشاركة والحاجة من القوى والوسائل اللازمة لتحقيق كافة الأهداف وتأمين استقرار الموقف في المحافظة، وتخصيص قوة احتياط جاهزة عند الطلب.

-2-

SYR.E0001.015.047

- 4- تزويد محافظة درعا بالعدد المناسب من العريات المصفحة من قوام العريات /ب.ت.ر. 152/ التي مستلمها وزارة الدفاع إلى وزارة الداخلية في بداية شهر كانون الأول 2011 م.
- 5- تكلف وزارة الداخلية باتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لتأمين حماية السفارات والرعايا الأجانب المقيمين في القطر وإشعارهم بذلك، وإعلان ذلك بوسائل الإعلام المناسبة بعد إجراء التنسيق اللازم مع مكتب الأمن القومي ووزارة الخارجية والمغتربين ووزارة الإعلام.
- 6- يكلف الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي بالتنسيق مع أمين فرع دمشق لحزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي للاتصال مع ذوي الضحايا لاستكمال ملف حادث برزة الذي وقع يوم 2011/11/9 لإحالاته للجهات القضائية المختصة.
- 7- الاعتماد على العمليات النوعية الصغيرة والناجحة المنفذة بناءً على معلومات دقيقة من قبل، والتي تم إعدادها خصيصاً لتنفيذ المهمة.
- 8- يكلف الرفيق رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي بمتابعة التنسيق مع وزارة الإعلام لاستكمال موضوع إذاعة أسماء الملاحقين والمطلوبين بوسائل الإعلام المختلفة.
- 9- يكلف رئيس مكتب الأمن القومي والرفيق وزير الداخلية دراسة تزويد الأجهزة الأمنية وخاصة العاملة في المحافظات الساخنة بعريات /البك آب/ وتركيب الأسلحة المناسبة عليها لاستخدامها في عمليات مكافحة المسلحين والإرهابيين.
- 10- يكلف الرفيق نائب القائد العام - وزير الدفاع باقتراح القادة المناسبين لتولي قيادة الأعمال في المحافظات الساخنة: (ادلب - حماة - حمص - ... الخ).
- 11- رفع توصية إلى الرفيق الأمين القطري المساعد للتنسيق مع رؤساء أحزاب الجبهة الوطنية التقدمية لظهورهم إعلامياً على شكل ندوات تساهم في شرح وجهات نظرهم للمساهمة في حل الأزمة التي يعيشها القطر حالياً.
- 12- استمرار تنفيذ العمليات حتى في حال وجود عناصر المراقبة لبعثة جامعة الدول العربية وذلك لبسط سيادة الدولة على أراضيها والمحافظة على أمن الوطن والمواطن.

يرجى التنفيذ والاطلاع

رئيس الخلية المركزية لإدارة الأزمات

SYR.D0178.001.007_ET

[Translator's Note: Translator's commentary is in brackets, and handwritten text is written in italics.]

13. Administrative Order, 26 November 2011

The Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
Deputy General Commander of the Army and Armed Forces
Minister of Defence

Highly Confidential
To be opened in person

Number: N/15486
Date: 26/11/2011

((Administrative Order))

In order to cope with the unrest and re-establish the stability in the Syrian Arab Region, in view of the central importance of the decision in the governorate, so as to contribute to the optimal use of the available forces and means,

Major General Fuad Ahmad Hammouda – Special Forces Commander

is charged with the command of all military units and formations, the different security forces, the internal security forces and the government and party authorities in Idleb Governorate and is considered head of the security committee.

All above-mentioned bodies are requested to fully comply with the orders and instructions issued by Major General Fuad Ahmad Hammouda - Special Forces Commander. Full cooperation and coordination between those concerned is requested for the implementation of organised special operations in order to achieve complete success, ensure the security and stability in the governorate and enhance the confidence of the citizens in their army and security forces.

A daily report with all activities carried out in the governorate is to be sent to the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces – Operations Commission.

Recipients:

- Chief of Staff's Office
- Crisis Cell
- Ministry of Interior
- Special Forces Commander
- Intelligence Department
- Air Force Intelligence Directorate
- State Security Directorate
- Political Security Department
- Archive

Field Marshal Bashar Al-Assad
General Commander of the Army
and Armed Forces

Represented by

Imad Dawoud Abdullah Rajiha
Deputy General Commander of the
Army and Armed Forces and
Minister of Defense

[Signature]

[Illegible Stamp]

[Illegible stamp]

No. 44225

6 1 768

Date: 26/11/2011



الرقم /١٥٤٨٦/ ن
التاريخ: / / ١٤
الموافق: ١١/١١/٢٠١١



الجمهورية العربية السورية
القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة
نائب القائد العام للجيش والقوات المسلحة
وزير الدفاع

.13

((أمر إداري))

بهدف مواجهة الاضطرابات وإعادة الاستقرار إلى القطر العربي السوري ،
ونظراً لأهمية مركزية القرار في المحافظة ،حيث يساهم
في الاستخدام الأمثل للقوى والوسائط المتوفرة يكلف :

اللواء فؤاد أحمد حمودة - قائد القوات الخاصة

بقيادة كافة الوحدات والقطعات والتشكيلات العسكرية ،والقوى الأمنية المختلفة ،
وقوى الأمن الداخلي ،والفعاليات الحكومية والحزبية في محافظة إدلب
ويعتبر رئيساً للجنة الأمنية .

يطلب من كافة الجهات المذكورة التمسك بالأوامر والتعليمات الصادرة
عن اللواء فؤاد أحمد حمودة - قائد القوات الخاصة ،والتعاون والتنسيق
التام بين جميع المعنيين لتنفيذ العمليات النوعية المنظمة لتحقيق النجاح التام ،
وتأمين الأمن والاستقرار في المحافظة وتعزيز ثقة المواطنين بجيشهم وقواه الأمنية .

يتم رفع تقرير يومي إلى القيادة العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة - هيئة العمليات
يشمل كافة الأعمال المنفذة في المحافظة .

الفريق بشار الأسد

القائد العام للجيش والقوات المسلحة

بالتفويض
العماد داود عبد الله راجحة
نائب القائد العام للجيش والقوات المسلحة-وزير الدفاع

المرسى إليهم:

- مكتب رئيس الأركان .
- خلية الأزمة .
- وزارة الداخلية .
- قائد القوات الخاصة .
- شعبة المخابرات
- إدارة المخابرات الجوية
- إدارة أمن الدولة
- شعبة الأمن السياسي
- المصنف

٤٤٢٢٥
٧٦٨ ١٦
٢٠١١ ١١ ١٦



cija-syria-regime.org

Follow us for updates of CIJA's work and achievements:



The Commission for International
Justice and Accountability



@CIJAOnline



@CIJAOnline

Support CIJA through a donation:

DONATE

<https://cijaonline.org/donate>